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ABSTRACT
Contemporary theorists of religion have argued that religious beliefs are “natural”
because they arise from normally functioning social cognitive capacities, especially Theory of
Mind (ToM). Hence, attempts to explain atheism have relied heavily on the assumption that
nonbelievers may have a malfunctioning ToM and other traits associated with the autism
spectrum continuum (ASC). However, few studies currently address this topic and the evidence
either way remains ambiguous. The current research narrows this empirical gap, addressing these
claims with a two-fold approach. First, a near comprehensive review of ToM is provided.
Second, this study is exploratory, employing a unique methodology and previously untapped
empirical measures to test for differences in ToM components and ASC traits between atheists
(N = 2423) and theists (N = 103).
Keywords: theory of mind; cognitive science of religion; evolutionary psychology; atheism;
religion
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CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTION

As soon as the important faculties of the imagination, wonder, and curiosity,
together with some power of reasoning, had become partially developed, man
would naturally crave to understand what was passing around him, and would
have vaguely speculated on his own existence….Nevertheless I cannot but
suspect that there is a still earlier and ruder stage, when anything which
manifests power or movement is thought to be endowed with some form of life,
and with mental faculties analogous to our own. – Charles Darwin “The Descent
of Man” (1871, p. 64)

When it comes to the topic of vague speculation over the existence of humans, Darwin
was clearly on to something. However, cognitive scientists might not postulate a specific
“faculty” as Darwin did for “imagination, wonder, curiosity, and reasoning.” Nonetheless,
collectively these entities fall under a broad category cognitive scientists do utilize, the social
brain. And in the spirit of Darwin’s passage, the social brain is rooted in this earlier, “ruder,”
stage, when the brain began—much as it continues today—to attribute human agency and
intentionality onto the ever changing environment. Animism is one of the oldest traits found in
hunter-gatherer societies (Peoples, Duda, & Marlowe, 2016). This attribution of agency and
intentionality has been highly adaptive, transporting homo sapiens into the cognitive niche we
occupy at present (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000; Pinker, 2010). Along with the capabilities
endowed to us by our social brains, however, comes several by-products, three of which are
highlighted: Autism, psychoses, and religion.
The topic of this thesis—differences in religiosity and the social brain— is informed by
the greater discipline of the cognitive sciences and cognitive science of religion in particular. The
terms religion, religious, religious belief, belief in gods, and other supernatural agents, are used
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interchangeably throughout and shall refer to the explicit acknowledgment of and commitment to
the proposition that there is exists some form of external, conscious, mental, agency, that is
concerned with human affairs. Chapter-by-chapter, this thesis is an additive process, it should be
read as a series of graduated steps, descent with modification—if you will—until the mental
systems of interest have been sufficiently characterized to cast the broadest possible light on the
role of theory of mind (ToM) in supernatural (non)belief.
The initial sections characterize an evolutionary account of two key aspects of social
cognition—causal cognition and joint intentionality (see Chapter II)—which is helpful for
elucidating the structure and functioning of two important (but largely overlapping) theoretical
accounts of ToM—the “theory of mind mechanism” and the “mindreading system” (see Chapter
III). When theory of mind is discussed in relation to cognitive science of religion, it shall refer to
the cognitive processes described by these two theories. Chapter IV reviews how theory of mind
and related constructs, such as traits characterized by the autism spectrum continuum have been
measured, before moving on to discuss variability and stability in theory of mind development
and functioning across cultures, within different contexts, and among clinical populations (see
Chapter V). Chapter VI reviews how folk psychology and its variability—which concerns the
higher level functioning of theory of mind—may relate to belief in supernatural agents. Chapter
VII, formally introduces the cognitive sciences of religion and the centrality of theory of mind
for explaining belief in these agents, discussing research relevant to the experimental aspects of
one key question: Do atheists and theists differ on basic socio-cognitive tendencies in
explanation for their belief or nonbelief in supernatural agents? Chapter VIII discusses the
diversity of nonbelief research and the remaining chapters present an empirical study testing for
ToM differences in atheists and believers.
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CHAPTER II.
ORIGINS OF THEORY OF MIND IN HUMAN EVOLUTION

Imagine you are playing billiards, a game of Eight-Ball with your friends. As you aim
and then release your billiard cue, taking the final shot, the pool cue strikes the cue-ball, which
strikes the eight-ball, launching it smoothly into the corner pocket. As you boast about this
victory to your opponent, you both appreciate the fact that one of you has won the game, while
the other has lost. The ability to sink the eight-ball in the corner pocket and the very fact that you
even have a friend to engage in both cooperative (you are playing by the rules after all) and
competitive (but you’re still out to win) behavior with are rooted in our everyday social
cognition. Specifically, this consist of causal cognition and joint intentionality.

Origins of Causal Cognition
One key ingredient to ToM is discerning causality. Causality pertains to conditional
reasoning, such that the agent can link one or more representations with another representation in
the form of if X, then Y. Understanding causal relations between entities—the ability to link a
given action, event, or thought, with another—is highly adaptive (Gopnik, 1993; Stuart-Fox,
2015a). While ToM has been variously conceived of as a module (Baron-Cohen, 1995),
mechanism (Leslie, 1994b), or even a network (Schaafsma, Pfaff, Spunt, & Adolphs, 2015), all
accounts include causal reasoning within this domain. Particularly as this relates to other
conspecifics, understanding causal relationships allows for the exchange of complex social
information (Sperber, 1994, 2000). For example, that, if Grog hits Thak, then Thak may hit
Grog, keep him away from the day’s meat ration, or perhaps even begin to build alliances against
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him within their group. Obviously the combinations of information that can be linked in this way
are potentially innumerable and although this is suggested to have been key for social cohesion
and the development of culture in anatomically modern Homo sapiens, this ability has
developmentally earlier roots (Dunbar, 2004; Kurzban & Barrett, 2012; Mithen, 1996).
Sometime between 6-8 million years ago lived the last common ancestor (LCA) shared
by modern day humans and chimpanzees (Steiper & Young, 2006). This LCA has yet to be
taxonomized and we know only little about early hominids such as Sahelanthropus, Orrorin, and
Ardipithecus (approximately 7-4 million years ago [MYA]). The past ten million years of
hominin evolution saw the development of the very things humans today take for granted today:
“bipedalism, large brains, extended life histories, complex social cognition, and the amplification
of technology” (Gamble, 2013, p. 33). One key aspect of this complex social cognition, also
known as theory of mind, was the capacity for casual reasoning (Baron-Cohen, 1999; Leslie,
1994b). While there is no crystal clear window to peer through in revisiting our evolutionary
deep history, proceeding cautiously, an informed picture can arise illuminating the origins of
causal reasoning. And while many animals have mechanisms designed to take advantage of the
statistical regularities of causality, the human ability to do this clearly stands out (Penn &
Povinelli, 2007).
The early hominids were bipedal and lived in woodland environments, however canopy
coverage was widely distributed and forays into more open grassland environments were likely
prevalent (Coolidge & Wynn, 2009; White, Lovejoy, Asfaw, Carlson, & Suwa, 2015). Beginning
slightly before Homo split from Pan and continuing into recent history, the climate patterns of
East Africa have demonstrated considerable variation (Maslin, Shultz, & Trauth, 2015). Climate
variability has played a large role in applying adaptive pressure to hominid evolution in response
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to shifting environmental demands (Maslin et al., 2015; Reed, 1997). Adept at locating fruits and
other food in the forest canopy, one of early hominids (and today’s homo sapiens) best cognitive
faculties was the visual system (Kaas, 2006, 2013; Stuart-Fox, 2015a). As the climate varied,
food demands waned and waxed, leading to a selective advantage for spatial memory systems
capable of mapping terrain, sources of food, and eventually stored food caches (Byrne, 1999;
Coolidge & Wynn, 2009).
Although this increase in territorial range clearly had advantages, it also opened up early
hominids to new predators (Gamble, 2013; Liebenberg, 1990). Thus, increased threat of
predation came from multiple sources, and mechanisms designed to extract every possible source
of information from one’s environment about the possibility of a threat would be highly
adaptive. Many species in the animal kingdom receive information from their environment and
other agents in the form of natural signs (Owren, Rendall, & Ryan, 2010; Stuart-Fox, 2015a).
The scent of blood, for example, relays information about a possible source of food for sharks.
And, male birds-of-paradise engage in elaborate displays of colorful plumage in attempt to signal
its readiness to mate to another female. These two natural signs (PREY, MATE; among many
others), depend on being automatically interpreted as they are produced. Without hesitation, for
example, once an odorant has entered the shark’s left or right nostril, the olfactory system
immediately registers PREY. Almost instantaneously, this signal is relayed to the motor system,
and like a missile homing in on its target, the shark’s body is propelled in the direction of the
scent (Gardiner & Atema, 2010). Thus, in order to track prey an animal must make and maintain
contact with a particular stimulus array—it must be perceptually coupled to its target. In contrast,
there is another class of natural signs that are mediated via the environment. These signs can
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persist long after the sign maker has left, hence do not require direct agent-to-target coupling for
their interpretation (Stuart-Fox, 2015a).
Natural signs, such as a claw mark on a tree or finding a mostly de-fleshed animal carcass
would have relayed an important source of visual information, being highly adaptive to detect for
early hominids coming under increasing threat of predation (Glenberg, 1997; Liebenberg, 1990).
Due to increasing memory capacity driven by foraging associated with environmental pressures
(Coolidge & Wynn, 2009), what Stuart-Fox terms (2015a) “incipient working memory,” these
hominids likely had the capacity to hold two mental representations in mind—just enough for a
cause and effect relationship to take root.
“The defining characteristic of visible indirect natural signs is that they have been
produced through prior behavior of some animal that is no longer visible” (Stuart-Fox, 2015a, p.
253). A plausible scenario is as follows: hominids tracking, (or being chased by large prey)
detect an animal scurry into a small cave. At the base of this cave entrance are tracks left by the
animal. The hominid registers these tracks, that animal. Whether it is disturbed foliage, blood on
a leaf, or a smilodon’s urine on a rock, the basic conceptual categories of PREDATOR and PREY
(Allen, 1999; Gallistel, 1989) are innately linked in species. However, unlike most other species,
as Stuart-Fox suggests, hominid’s innate propensity for curiosity, mixed with a constantly
shifting environment with multiple threats, tuned the beginnings of causal cognition to a hairtrigger, yet also selected for great flexibility in their application. However, it was the extraction
of this visual information detached from its source and consolidated into a single conceptual
category, in which learning to make connections between “categories of signs to the categories
that made them” would have been an extremely beneficial adaptation (Stuart-Fox, 2015a, p.
252).
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The ability to connect representations in the mind, and work backwards—through several
signs—to establish causation is a uniquely human ability. Causal cognition is the foundation
upon which many higher order, distinctively human, behaviors rest. However, while it appears
necessary for consciousness it is by no means sufficient. The use of information provided by
these visible indirect natural signs is what drove hominin evolution further apart from its forest
ape cousins (Stuart-Fox, 2015a, 2015b). Of course, it is due to many factors coalescing and
accruing over time, not just one ability per se, that ultimately come together to support human
uniqueness in certain domains.

Oldowan and Acheulean Industries: Implications for Joint Intentionality
While causal reasoning may have been some of the first cognitive processes to utilize a
representation that was detached from the thing it represented, the capability to use and combine
representations in a flexible manner was further driven by the production of tools (Suddendorf,
1999). The archaeological records reveal rich insight into the cognitive capabilities of our
ancestors beginning around 2.5MYA. The habitats of these hominins consisted of an eclectic mix
of biodiversity and evidence of tool use and butchery accompanies this diversity. Roughly 2
MYA at the Olduvai Gorge in what is now Tanzania, for example, there is geographical,
archaeological, and biomarker evidence for a varied landscape, consisting of a freshwater spring
bordered by a rich variety of wetland plants and a wooded forest area surrounded by open
grasslands, with numerous deposits of animal bones etched with cut marks (Magill, Ashley,
Domínguez-Rodrigo, & Freeman, 2016).
Adept at basic causal reasoning, tracking small prey and scavenging were critical survival
activities of hominids during this time. However, once you locate a tuber you have to be able to
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dig it up, and if you find a mammoth carcass you won’t be sitting quietly by its side snacking.
Other larger animals, are likely also vying for the same meat, and the capability to take meat
with you certainly has its advantages (Gamble, 2013; Wynn, 2002). Tool manufacture and use
were of critical importance in the Lower Paleolithic and can divulge further secrets about the
origins of a ToM system (Coolidge & Wynn, 2009; Mithen, 1996).
While the “first tool” may have come from discovering a broken rock with a sharp edge
made for easier digging or butchering of meat, the best tools, and indeed even rudimentary tools
are not made by accident. The intentional production of tools by striking one rock against
another in order to affect its shape is called knapping. Although there has never been a natural
documented case of primates flaking of stone tools, the percussive motions involved in striking
with a rock have been documented and it is likely that very early hominids were capable of this
(Haslam et al., 2009; Roux & Bril, 2005).
The appearance of Oldowan tools speaks to the increasing reliance on a diet of meat by
our ancestors. The earliest tools, known as the Oldowan industry, were made of small pebbles
that had been struck by another rock to reveal a sharp edge. These tools were likely made on
demand, as needed, used for butchering a carcass, and then discarded. Wynn (2002, p. 395)
describes these early tools as “ad hoc technology,” noting that “it is unlikely that they existed as
tools in the minds of the knappers.”
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Figure 1 Example of Oldowan “pebble technology” by José-Manuel Benito Àlvarez, 1987, via
Wikimedia Commons. Used under Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 2.5
Generic license

To be sure, there are discrepancies within the literature as to the interpretation of the
archaeological evidence (Lycett & Chauhan, 2010). For example, Toth and Schick (2009),
perhaps speaking of later Oldowan industries, suggest that these tools were carried form location
to location, and even certain rock types were selected for. Hence, this indicates the appearance of
more complex cognitive capabilities, such as planning and foresight.
Strikingly, stone tools remained relatively unchanged in form from 2.5—1.5MYA.
However, beginning around 1.5MYA up until around 500,000 years ago, in what is known as the
Acheulean industry, stone tools began to exhibit increasing levels of complexity. For example,
rather than appearing as merely sharp rock fragments upon first glance, as much of the Oldowan
industry could be mistaken for, Acheulean technology begins to show the hallmarks of design
that is clearly intentional (Wynn, 2002). These tools, often known as “bi-faces” in reference to
their apparent symmetry, required the tool maker to hold a representation of the final product in
their mind while actively constructing this tool.
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Figure 2 Example of a biface Acheulean hand Axe by José-Manuel Benito, 2002 via Wikimedia
Commons, Public Domain

Thus, and in referring back to incipient working memory (Stuart-Fox, 2015a), at this
point in evolution our Homo ancestors had the ability to hold 2 goal representations (or more) in
working memory at once (Coolidge & Wynn, 2009). However, and missing from the early
evolution of causal cognition, these later hominids were able to utilize this multi representational
capacity with directed self-attention. In other words, rather than relationships between natural
signs and their responses being automatic, the ability to begin to attentively direct, inhibit, or
apply new category relationships was likely developing during this time. Attention and goal
directed mental states are key—one cannot hit a rock just anywhere, and with any amount of
force, and expect an Acheulean hand axe to be produced. Aside from the attentional resources,
and finely tuned motor capabilities evidenced by tool production (Faisal, Stout, Apel, & Bradley,
2010), Acheulean tool production required cooperation. Producing these more complex tools
required using a prepared “core” and a special “hammer stone.” The core was prefabricated to
fracture along points in the rock, flaking off a sharper edge when struck with the hammerstone.
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There are many sites scattered throughout the world with hundreds, perhaps thousands, of both
used and unused cores, hammers, and finished hand axes. Tool making was a large industry. This
was far from a solitary operation of lone tool makers and our hominid ancestors had not yet
developed the vocal and cognitive capabilities to produce the syntax required for the generativity
inherent in human language (Dunbar, 2004). Instead of language, this cooperation speaks to the
unique human ability of joint attention (J. L. Barrett, 2011; Coolidge & Wynn, 2009; Tomasello,
2014). Joint attention is the ability to form a triadic representation in the mind of an individual,
such that, I know that you know that we are both attending to the same subject [either an object
or perhaps a mental state (Baron-Cohen, 1995)]. Our ancestors used joint attention to guide the
shaping of rocks into highly specialized tools. When we see another conspecific, in most cases,
our joint attention is automatically activated. For example, if we happen to notice even a
complete stranger starring up at the afternoon sky, our attention shifts to become more in-line
with theirs, in attempt to attend to the same perceived object or event, we look up to figure out
what they’re looking at. We interpret their behavior in terms of underlying goals and intentions
to act (people don’t accidentally stare at the sky). But for our ancestors, one can easily imagine
Homo erctus or heidelbergensis (or a modern day brick mason) using protodeclarative gestures
to indicate what rocks were to be used in manufacturing the tools and what were to be discarded
(Tomasello & Carpenter, 2007). Furthermore, joint attention is key to the process of knapping
itself. It facilitates a “do this” or “copy me” directive (Shipton & Nielsen, 2015) which in the
absence of verbal communication is only possible by two or more conspecifics sharing attention
at an event or object. But to reiterate, Homo sapiens often go beyond mere copying or imitation,
when we see another human engaged in some kind of (in)action “we ask why, or to what end”
(H. C. Barrett, 2015).
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CHAPTER III.
THEORY OF MIND MECHANISMS

Causal cognition and joint intentionality form key aspects of ToM. The two theories of
ToM discussed here provide mechanistic characterizations of the relationship between these
aspects. Mechanistic characterization of the interplay between thought processes within a
complex system allows for specific subcomponents to be identified in a hierarchical fashion
(Bechtel & Richardson, 1993). That is to say, you can look at parts of the “mind,” how they are
organized, and based on that, they will be organized in some ways and not others. Although
these two theories of ToM largely overlap, I discuss them both because they have provided the
dominant characterization of ToM as a mechanism or “module” in ToM research in general and
this approach has also largely guided the evolutionary cognitive sciences of religion, in specific
(J. W. Jones, 2016). Additionally, in this study I connect shared elements of these theories,
empirically testing some of their component parts in relation to supernatural belief. Theories of
ToM emphasizing its development as conceptual change or re-description, often known as
“theory theories” (Gelman & Legare, 2011; Gopnik, 1998; Karmiloff-Smith, 1995), receive only
little discussion here, as they describe a change in ToM performance and not the discovery of
new conceptual information (Caron, 2009; Goldman, 2012; Leslie, German, & Polizzi, 2005;
Scholl & Leslie, 1999).

Leslie’s Theory of Agency
Leslie (1987, 1994b) provides a hierarchal model of how agency is represented and
processed by postulating two distinct cognitive modules with sub processing mechanisms (see
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also Leslie, Friedman, & German, 2004). Contained within these modules are three specific,
interrelated, domains of knowledge about Agency: mechanical, actional, and attitudinal. These
domains constitute our universal, evolutionary endowed, cognitive architecture, which forms the
basis for learning and can be traced back (in part) to recurring properties of the world (Cosmides
& Tooby, 2013; Tooby & Cosmides, 1992, 2000, 2008). Combined, they are considered “core
knowledge,” forming the basis by which cultural learning can proceed (Carey, 2011; Sperber &
Hirschfeld, 1999, 2004). The notion of “Agency,” is a core concept derived from these two
modules, referring exclusively to objects capable of, or involved in, what appears as causation
(Leslie, 1994b). The actional and attitudinal domains of Agency constitute the Theory of Mind
Mechanism (ToMM) and the mechanical domain constitutes the Theory of Body mechanism
(ToBy).1

Table 1 Core architecture for the cognition of Agency (adapted from Leslie, 1994b, p. 122)
A Tripartite Theory of Agency
Real World Properties of
Agents
mechanical
actional
cognitive
X

Processing Device
ToBy
ToMM (system1)
ToMM (system2)
Selection Processor (SP)
“rear end” of the ToMM

Levels of Understanding or
“theories”
“Agents and Objects”
“Agents and Action”
“Agents and Attitudes”
Learning mechanism
responsible for creating
“theories”

It is worth pointing out that Leslie’s three domains of Agency closely follow Dennett’s (1987) distinctions between
the “design stance,” the “intentional stance,” and the “physical stance.” This indicates what basic categories Leslie’s
tripartite theory consist of. This is in part, because both rely on folk psychological assumptions in lieu of positions,
for example, such as eliminative materialism, which view folk psychological states (beliefs and desires) as a
radically false foundation for a science of the mind (Churchland, 1981, 1993, 2007).
1
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Theory of Body Mechanism
Due to its privileged operating position within cognitive structure, ToBy is the first
mechanism within Leslie’s Theory of Agency. For a helpful analogy, imagine individuals
(Agents) trying to get into a night club; they will have to pass through the bouncer at the door. In
a sense, ToBy can be thought of as the “night club bouncer” of the ToMM—no Agent gets in
without going through ToBy. The ToBy is a module targeting purely mechanical, causal
relationships, between bounded, spatiotemporal objects in the world. For example, the launching
of one billiard ball as a result of colliding with another. ToBy can be activated not only from
visual information, but also via haptic and kinesthetic sensation. When a cause and effect
relationship of this type is detected through motion by ToBy, it activates the “primitive” concept
of FORCE (Leslie, 1994b). Whereas we would properly say there was a transfer of energy
between the billiard balls occurring “in the world,” FORCE can be thought of as the “cognitive
correlate of energy” (p. 125, italics in original). FORCE, which concerns the movement and
spatiotemporal arrangement of objects, interprets these “objects in terms of the sources and fates
– the dynamics – of FORCE” (Leslie, 1987, p. 128). It is worth briefly pointing out, but will be
described in greater depth later on, that the relationship described between objects, by FORCE,
understood broadly as agent detection, constitutes an important source of explanans for
supernatural belief within CSR (J. L. Barrett, 2004, 2012; Bering, 2006, 2011; Boyer, 2001,
2003; Guthrie, 1995; Guthrie et al., 1980; McCauley, 2011; Norenzayan, 2013; Xygalatas,
2014).
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Theory of Mind Mechanism
The mechanical properties of Agents set them apart from non-Agents. The ToMM
identifies certain classes of objects as Agents, as being motivated by goal state. For example,
infant studies demonstrate that human hand reach indicates special mechanical, agentive,
attributes when compared to movement using a square block or even a mechanical claw with
digits (Cannon & Woodward, 2012; Leslie, 1984; Woodward, 1998). Thus the movement of
objects can trigger ToBy (this is why the infants responded at all to the hand, block, and claw
instead of staring blankly). However, with the arrival of the ToMM, infants begin to treat some
objects as being guided by goals. Once ToBy identifies an object as an Agent, the ToMM is
needed to describe the relationship between the goal states of the Agent and the given action.
There are two sub-systems to the ToMM and system1 introduces the concept of “ACTING,”
(Leslie, 1994b, p. 139), described as “ACTING to obtain X,” or to work so as to bring about a
specific state of affairs and not some other. Importantly, Leslie (1994b) notes that the structure of
an ACTING or a desire is not represented propositionally, they can be neither true nor false, they
simply are (see also Hutto, 2008; Malle, 2004). In this sense, ACTING is similar to a
behavioristic explanation, only discussed in terms of dispositions and drives. Developmentally,
with the activation of this rule, desire psychology is enabled (Bach, 2014), and infants
understand that Agents act with intentionality (for a review, see Caron, 2009).
System2 of the ToMM develops slightly later and with its arrival comes the ability to
represent thoughts propositionally, as either true or false (Leslie, 1994b). At this stage, full
blown “belief-psychology” is possible. The ToMM introduces both the concept of pretending
and the concept of believing.2 Individuals now understand that other Agents not only act based

2

Other accounts of ToM postulate that beliefs and pretends are represented quite differently from one another (e.g.
Perner, 1991).
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on desires, but that beliefs are a motivating force in the generation of behavior and that Agents
can both deceive and be deceived. As will be discussed next, the representations processed by a
fully functioning ToMM have special characteristics that set them apart from other
representations.

Selection Processor
Most humans assume others are guided by true beliefs. The concepts of belief and desire
(mental state concepts) represent the relationship between an agent’s attitude toward an object or
situation. These relationships are called “informational relations” in virtue of the content they
can be said to represent (i.e., what is the belief/thought about?) and permit learning the deeper
aspects of social cognition, such as the fact that others may be guided in their behavior by false
beliefs, are subject to intentional deception, and also have the capacity to intentionally deceive.
However, these deeper aspects of social cognition also require more than the implicit or explicit
understanding of the mental states concepts provided by the ToMM. They draw on resources
such as memory and executive functioning in order to select the relevant belief contents (Leslie,
1994a, 2000; Leslie et al., 2005). Leslie suggests a domain-general mechanism, the selection
processor (SP), a mechanism of “selective attention” (Leslie, 2000), is the final system to
develop in the ToMM, creating the ToMM-SP.
The typical false-belief task requires the participant be able to override their default
assumptions about beliefs—that they are always true—and chose that the other individual
actually has a belief that is false. This means that typical false-belief tasks make extra demands
on EF that can mask performance, as the child has to select the proper belief by a process of
inhibiting the “true belief” (Bloom & German, 2000; Leslie, 2000). Additionally, when the
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demands of the false-belief task are loosened to ask “where will Sally look for her toy first,”
instead of “where will Sally believe her toy is at,” children are able to pass the test at a much
younger age. Looking helps calculate belief (Leslie, 2000).
The SP enables the child to move beyond the tacit understanding of belief provided by
the ToMM, and towards learning about a wide array of more specific mental states (e.g.,
sadness), their implications for behavior (e.g., sad people might isolate), and how one might
respond in kind (e.g., comfort sad people). Thus, the SP “colors in” and contextualizes the basic
informational relation provided by the concept of belief and desire. This will be an important
point to keep in mind as the discussion of ToM moves from mechanisms to deployment as an
adult embedded in a world of supernatural agent concepts and beliefs.

Meta-representations
According to Leslie (1987, 1994a, 1994b), the ToMM operates using specialized
representations. Primary representations are transparent, they stand in direct semantic
relationship to a perceptual state of affairs in the world and can be either true or false (e.g., This
is a banana. That is a telephone.). In contrast, Meta-representations (M-representations) are
derived from primary representations, however decoupled from their referent, they are opaque
and lack conditions for veridicality (Bloch, 2008; Leslie, 1994a). M-representations allow for
pretense, which is an early version of a full blown ToM (Leslie, 1987; Premack & Woodruff,
1978). By blending two or more primary representations, one can pretend to have, for example,
“a banana that is also a telephone.” Thus, M-representations are representations of
representations (Leslie, 1987; Sperber, 1994, 2000). That these representations are decoupled, or
bracketed off from strict logical truth relations, is critically important in the case of M-
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representations. This prevents the application of a primary representation in absurd ways, what
Leslie (1987, p. 417) terms “representational abuse,” such as when one pretends an empty cup
contains water. By necessity an empty cup cannot contain something, unless the representational
context of pretense is specified. Thus, all M-representations are tagged within the context of
pretense, acting “As-if.” This process of adding a “tag” to the representation allows for a single
representational code to function logically in switching back and forth between primary thought
and pretense. Because our folk psychology is always fallible (i.e., representing mental states
opens up the possibility of mis-representation, as in the case of a false-belief), mental state
representations are prima facie M-representations (J. L. Barrett, 2011; Leslie, 1987; Sperber,
2000; Suddendorf, 1999).
Leslie’s (1994b) theory of Agency, containing ToBy, ToMM-SP, and M-representations,
is one of the earliest full models attempting to account for how mind and behavior reading is
computed. It is important to note that Leslie’s account, indeed almost all accounts of theory of
mind, focus almost exclusively on accounting for this capacity in infants and children as it
develops, and have comparatively little to say about ToM in adults or even teens (Apperly, 2012,
2013). This is important to keep in mind, because as an individual grows up, becomes
enculturated, experiencing and entering in to a wide array of increasingly complex social
relationships with multiples levels of intentionality (Dunbar, 2004), discussing ToM, too,
becomes incredibly complex (Whiten, 2013). Nonetheless, Leslie’s theory of Agency serves as
the starting point for discussing the theories of mental architecture responsible for the structure
of mind reading.
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Baron-Cohen’s Mindreading System
Baron-Cohen’s (1995, 1999) account of mindreading closely parallels Leslie’s (1994a,
1994b) version. For example, both conclude that recurring properties of the world should be
reflected (in part) in an evolved cognitive modular architecture. Thus many of the component
sub-mechanisms of each theory of mind overlap (e.g., detecting intentionality). Both rely heavily
on developmental studies and suggest that the primary factor responsible for the autism spectrum
continuum is an impairment in the ToM system (Baron-Cohen, 1987, 1995, 2009; Baron-Cohen,
Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Leslie, 1987, 1994a). However, it is worth discussing some of the key
differences, as well as briefly drawing direct comparisons between some of the constructs of
each.
Baron-Cohen’s (1995, p. 32) “mindreading system” describes four hierarchally arranged
sub-mechanisms: Intentionality Detector (ID); Eye Detection Device (EDD); Shared Attention
Mechanism (SAM); Theory of Mind Mechanism (ToMM).

ID

EDD

SAM

ToMM
Figure 3 The Theory of Mind Mechanism
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Intentionality Detector
The ID is a perceptual, supramodal mechanism, which tags anything that is registered as
“non-random sound” self-propelled and directional stimuli as “AGENT” – attributing goals and
desires (Baron-Cohen, 1995, p. 34). Importantly, this device will accept anything that is agentlike, thus its actual domain is much larger than its proper domain (c.f., Sperber, 1994; Sperber &
Hirschfeld, 2004). Similar to Leslie’s (1994b) overall theory of agency, the input parameters for
detecting intentionality are “set fairly loosely” (Baron-Cohen, 1995, p. 35). As will demonstrated
later, this point is of critical concern in discussing CSR and belief/nonbelief, considering BaronCohen notes that false positives, such as mistaking a cloud for an agent (e.g., (e.g., Guthrie,
1995), should be overridden given proper experience and background knowledge (Ibid).
On Baron-Cohen’s (1995) account, the function of the ID, detecting intentionality, is
conceptually similar to a blend of Leslie’s (1994b) ToBy and ToMM1. The first comparison lies
in how both ToBy and the ID are attempts at generating a structural description of things in the
external world by “picking out objects.” Detecting movement is critical to both, however ToBy’s
evolved function is concerned prima facie with separating agents from non-agents and describing
the mechanical relationships of physical objects, it does not interpret these relationships as
intentional (i.e., goal driven). However, according to Baron-Cohen (1995, p. 35), the ID has been
structured exclusively for the “social or animate world,” and hence does interpret representations
in intentional terms, even of non-agents. Subsequently this is also why the ID shares functions
with Leslie’s ToMM1—by having access to goal-desire concepts. In summary, the differences
that are suggested to exist between the ID, ToBy, and ToMM1 appear superficial at most and, if
there are differences, these may not be the kind of differences that make a difference (c.f.,
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Kodish, 2012). For example, in what has been relegated to an endnote in Mindblindness, BaronCohen (1995, p. 146) states “…one possibility is that ID may be a submodule of ToBy.”

Eye Detection Device
“Don’t fire until you see the whites of their eyes,” goes the famous battle cry issued by a
General during the Battle of Bunker Hill, in order to ensure each shot fired met its target.
Interestingly, humans are the only primates to have a white sclera surrounding their pupil
(Baron-Cohen, 1995; Emery, 2000). “The whites of their eyes” are not so much for targeting
bullets to your neighbor’s head, as they are for targeting mental state information about your
neighbor’s head. Detecting and responding to eyes, or simply spots that look like eyes, is found
across animal taxa, has an extremely deep evolutionary homology, stretching back “tens of
millions of years” (Janzen, Hallwachs, & Burns, 2010, p. 11659).3

3

For a technical discussion of whether or not animal eyespots really mimic eyes, see Stevens (Stevens & Ruxton,
2014) and (Stevens, Hardman, & Stubbins, 2008). Regardless of whether this counts as actual mimicry of eye spots,
or things that look like eye spots, they carry valuable information that animals detect and respond to.
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Figure 4 Examples of animal “eye spots” from left to right, Papilip troilus larva / by poppy2323/
CC BY-NC 3.0; Pavo cristatus / by Worm That Turned / CC SA-3.0; Pelvicachromis
taeniatus / Public Domain; Caligo Oedipus / by D. Gordon E. Robertson / CC SA-3.0

Both Baron-Cohen (1995, 1999) and McCauley (2011) suggest a special device (although
not special to humans) for the detection of eyes. There is growing support for the convergent
evolution of this ToM component in corvids and apes (Bugnyar, Reber, & Buckner, 2016; Emery
& Clayton, 2004). The EDD’s only input is from the visual system. It has three tasks: targeting
eyes or eye like stimuli, registering eye gaze, and, based on the first person perspective,
computing whether or not the other agent has the mental state of a SEEING.
In contrast to the ID, which computes representations in terms of goals and desires (agent
wants X), the EDD’s representational options are limited to a game of peekaboo: “see’s me” and
agent “doesn’t see me.” Both of these mechanisms function to produce dyadic representations.
However, the ID and EDD on their own cannot produce the rich “shared” representations that
characterize more advanced ToM.
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Shared Attention Mechanism
Using the mental state representations produced by ID and EDD, the shared attention
mechanism (SAM) produces triadic representations (Baron-Cohen, 1995). Thus the SAM accepts
information from any modality. However, SAM has a privileged relationship with EDD, due to
the centrality of vision for navigating our world, it is simply easier to draw information about
mental states through visual access than, say, haptic sensation (Ibid). SAM builds representations
such that, one can register: I see Ralph looking (perceptual mental state) at the snake. Thus the
agent can attend to the fact that another agent is attending to another fact: I know that you know.
The SAM takes EDD’s seeings and typically interprets them in terms of a goal or desire. For
example, I may see Ralph looking at the snake, but I will also be looking for the nature of his
dyadic representation with the snake: Is Ralph scared to see this snake or excited? Clearly SAM
reveals rich information, however more is needed before the mind reading system is able to
handle propositional thought.

Theory of Mind Mechanism
In Baron-Cohen’s (1995, p. 51) mind reading system, the ID, EDD, and SAM, come
together to form the ability to infer “the full range of mental states” in the ToMM. At this final
stage, the development of the ToMM is marked by the ability to engage in pretense, as it enables
propositional thought, by using referentially opaque M-representations. The ToMM is borrowed
from Leslie’s (1994b) use of the term, as Baron-Cohen (1995, p. 51) goes along with “much
about what Leslie says about the working of the ToMM.” These two accounts, therefore, appear
rather similar and this convergence can be viewed as a strength—these theories are functionally
equivalent.
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Leslie and Baron-Cohen Compared
Leslie (1994a, 1994b) and Baron-Cohen (1995, 1999) share the idea that ToM is an:
evolutionarily ancient, thoroughly computational, domain specific, impaired in the case of
autism, largely or wholly unaffected by language, early developmental unfolding of an innate
capacity and that a specialized representational vehicle, known as the M-representation, provides
the required structure to support the kind of content bearing propositional thought that allows
one’s ToM to learn culturally, acquiring explicit folk psychological theories. That both Leslie’s
(1994a, 1994b) and Baron-Cohen’s (1995, 1999)’s accounts of ToM should be so similar is to be
expected; both researchers are drawing on the same array of developmental studies in outlining
their models and variables such as intentionality, action, desires, and beliefs, which are stock-intrade for describing any account of mindreading (Apperly, 2011, 2012; Brüne & Brüne-Cohrs,
2006; Schaafsma et al., 2015). To use a cooking analogy, the differences between Leslie and
Baron-Cohen’s versions of ToM appear not as different “cake recipes,” but as “different ways of
cutting the same cake.”

Variation in “Modules” and the Function of “Executive Functioning”
When discussing possible cultural variation in ToM (see Chapter V), the notion of
modularity is important to consider. CSR explicitly (Boyer, 2001, 2003; McCauley, 2011;
Sperber & Hirschfeld, 1999, 2004) and implicitly (J. L. Barrett, 2012; Beit-Hallahmi, 2015;
Boyer & Bergstrom, 2008; Bulbulia, 2005) refers to cognitive modules in explaining
supernatural beliefs, but seldom discuss their actual characteristics or parameters.
Leslie (1994b) emphasizes innateness and modularity to a greater extent than BaronCohen does (1995, pp. 56-58; but, see also Baron-Cohen, 1998). Baron-Cohen eschews the label
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of “modularity,” as he largely rejects Fodor’s (1983) restrictive and ridged structural
characterization of modules, whereas Leslie is more willing to embrace them.4 Although there
are many misconceptions about modularity, one key misunderstanding is that modules all exhibit
a strong form of informational encapsulation; the idea that some perceptual and cognitive
information is impervious to cultural alteration. Fodor draws upon the apparent culturally
invariant effects of the Müller Lyer illusion on the human visual system to prove the point. He
argues that, despite having the information (knowledge) that the segment between the two arrow
lengths is identical, the perception of dissimilar lengths remains.

Figure 5 Müller Lyer illusion

However, McCauley and Henrich (2006) reviewed the cross-cultural studies utilizing this
illusion, finding that susceptibility to it varies depending on cultural input during key
developmental windows. Thus, while a cognitive system may be modular, it can also display
some level of flexibility and plasticity (H. C. Barrett, 2012; H. C. Barrett & Kurzban, 2006;
Cosmides & Tooby, 1994).

4

For extensive discussions on the various ways to characterize modularity, see (Baron-Cohen, 1999; H. C. Barrett,
2012, 2015; H. C. Barrett & Kurzban, 2006; Buller & Hardcastle, 2000; Sperber, 1994; Sperber & Hirschfeld,
2004).
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Domain specific, adaptationist, modular accounts have been critiqued for relying solely
on the evolutionary environment of adaptation to characterize the functioning of a particular
mental system, for their alleged innateness, inflexibility, and inability to learn (Chiappe &
MacDonald, 2005; J. W. Jones, 2016). There is much to agree with here, however these critiques
may be more a caricature than a character of evolutionary psychology. Modular, adaptationist
accounts, have been revised (re-conceptualized) well beyond the narrow sightedness enveloped
in the early schematics of modularity critiqued above. For example, modules can function as
(both) fast (Type 1) or slow (Type 2) processes (H. C. Barrett, 2012; Morgan, 2016), levels of
informational encapsulation will also vary, and thus integration with other systems and modules,
or “learning,” will exhibit heterogeneity. Still, the central feature of modularity is functional
specification (Cosmides & Tooby, 2013; Kurzban & Athena Aktipis, 2007).
Cognitive systems without functional specification are non-practical in the same way a
carpenter’s tool box would be useless if it only contained a single “general tool,” or array of
vaguely specified generic tools (Cosmides & Tooby, 2002). Natural selection drives adaptive
specialization towards increasing functionality in the face of utter disarray (Cosmides & Tooby,
1994; Tooby, Cosmides, & Barrett, 2003). The characteristics of these adaptations can be quite
diverse and may function in evolutionary novel situations and environments, but they still serve
to filter out some information within the possible space of all decisions that could in fact be
made.
Executive functioning (or the supervisory attentional system) is often described in the
literature as a general ability comprising of working memory and the selection/inhibition of
response in achieving some goal (Morasch, Raj, & Bell, 2013). There is also a robust discussion
as to whether executive functioning is unitary in nature or consists of some procedural
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specialization (Ardila, 2008; Miyake, Friedman, Rettinger, Shah, & Hegarty, 2001; Morasch et
al., 2013). Yet even these proposals leave undefined any ultimate function, what are/were
executive capabilities for?
Evolutionary psychologists agree that the brain handles information in ways described by
the wealth of excellent research on executive functioning capabilities, such as shifting, updating,
or inhibition. However, they do disagree that these mechanisms exist without any functional
specification, without any domain. Laboratory paradigms used to measure executive function
typically focus on abstract tasks (e.g., Tower of Hanoi), which are content free, however, when
“social situations and biological drives are involved, the ability to rationally solve problems
seems to decrease in a significant way” (Ardila, 2008, p. 97). For example, when the Wason
selection task, originally involving an arbitrary reasoning process that individual’s ultimately
proved altogether horrible at, is reframed so that the participant has to reason about whether or
not a social rule is being violated, task performance increases substantially (Cosmides, 1989;
Sugiyama, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2002). When the task moves from a general one to become more
specific, the functionality of the system can display more, not less intelligence.
This is because natural selection has designed the brain not as an abstract, general,
problem solver, but as a series of specialized computational devices (H. C. Barrett, 2015), that
handle content in specific ways. The absence of discussion between executive function
psychologists and evolutionary psychologists has, combined with the general suspicion of
evolutionary psychology and self-disciplinary narrow sightedness present in almost every field,
produced two strangers with overlapping interests that just need a proper introduction to hit it off
right. Part of the misalignment pertains to the functional properties of the mind and where they
are stored or what system they reside in. For example, executive function researchers commonly
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cite tasks in which automatic activation of responses would be unwise (Chiappe & MacDonald,
2005). However, this does not color all of the executive function literature, not all domains
generate automatic responses, or are incapable of delivering more controlled or refined abilities
(H. C. Barrett, 2015). Indeed, evolutionary psychologists do acknowledge a small helping of less
specified mechanisms (H. C. Barrett, 2015; Cosmides & Tooby, 1992; Krill, Platek, Goetz, &
Shackelford, 2007).
Given the paucity of general, generic, environmental problems to overcome (Cosmides &
Tooby, 1994, 2002), combined with the recurring force of more or less specific problems,
perhaps domain general skills, evolved within the array of modules within the social brain.
Similar proposals have been put forth in ridding psychology of folk notions of “the self”
(Kurzban & Athena Aktipis, 2007), which rather than existing as a unitary sui generis, mystical,
essence, is the clap trap propaganda of an array of specialized cognitive devices exchanging
information within specific environmental contexts. Given the strong systematic feedback of
selective pressures for adaptations in the social domain, the appearance of generality could have
developed from this. Thus, domain generality may be a collection of slower processing features
of special computational devices with actual domains much larger than the target domains.
Even systems which are often considered domain general, such as executive functioning
or the supervisory attention system, etc. are biased toward the social domain. For example,
humans don’t apply their “attention” to the underside of a plant leaf such as the Acythosiphon
pisum do (pace the exception of a biologist or two), but in principle they could if attention was
some all-purpose, unspecified, general learning function. In other words, above all, human
attention is focused towards communicating with other humans. Importantly, even though human
cognition is geared towards sociality (Bandura, 2001; Korman, Voiklis, & Malle, 2015; Pinker,
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2010), this does not prevent it from functioning elsewhere outside the social domain (H. C.
Barrett, 2015; Cosmides & Tooby, 2002; Sperber & Hirschfeld, 2004) and it does not prevent the
development of fine grained specialization within a particular domain of information, as
evidenced by the very fact that biologists exist alongside a great many other specialists, from
bakers and stock brokers, to sail boat riggers and plumbers. However, as any comparative
biologist can attest to, they must be vigilant against constant anthropomorphization of their
research. Even science can be constrained by folk cognition (Shtulman, 2015) and even scientists
display tendencies to perceive intention where there is none (Kelemen, Rottman, & Seston,
2013). This marks the pervasiveness of the social brains influence on all cognition.
The human “attentional” system is biased through and through towards a specialization in
the social cognitive domain. This is because, on average, when any one of our “attentional
systems” is triggered or applied, either by movement (Heider & Simmel, 1944), hearing a bump
in the night (J. L. Barrett, 2004), seeing faces in the clouds (Guthrie, 1995), ultimate meaning in
serendipitous events (Bering, 2002, 2003, 2011) etc., its default is the social realm of intentional
agents with internal states such as beliefs and desires, when and where attentional facilities are
employed in human cognition, we look for a mind first and ask questions later. When discussing
the function of executive functions, supervisory attention systems, or some other “general”
supervisory system, these mechanisms are likely part and parcel of social cognition modules.
H.C. Barrett (2012, 2015) has argued that the empirical signature of human brain
adaptations (i.e., modules) may turn out to be quite different from what psychologists currently
believe. This is because we should expect that an evolutionary descent with modification
approach to brain functional organization will have produced modular adaptations exhibiting
heterogeneity in their functional characteristics. Thus, the distinction between domain general
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and domain specific could therefore be far fuzzier than anyone has predicted. Regardless, BaronCohen (1995, 1999, 2009; Baron-Cohen & Belmonte, 2005) and Leslie’s (1987, 1994a, 1994b,
2000; Leslie et al., 2004) models of ToM give us some of the central neurocognitive modules of
the social brain (Adolphs, 2009; Baron-Cohen & Belmonte, 2005; Crespi, 2016; Crespi &
Badcock, 2008; Dunbar, 2009; Frith & Frith, 2010; Gamble, 2013).
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CHAPTER IV.
MEASURING THEORY OF MIND AND ASSOCIATED CONSTRUCTS
Different aspects of ToM are commonly measured using tests that probe an individual’s
ability to understand false beliefs, detect mental states and provide an appropriate response,
detect sarcasm or white lies. There are also individual differences in ToM ability, which, if
careful attention is paid, can be detected in day-to-day conversations with others, particularly
individuals with the Autism/Asperger’s spectrum continuum (ASC). A perturbation in normal
ToM processes has been primarily implicated in explanation of ASC individuals varying levels
of trouble understanding intentionality and meta-representational ability (Baron-Cohen, 1995,
2009; Leslie, 1987, 1994a). Below, several measures of traits associated with ASC are discussed,
which are often operationalized to refer to various components of social cognition. Some of these
measures—the Broader Autism Phenotype Questionnaire, Reading the Mind in the Eyes, and
Rosset’s (Rosset, 2008) intentionality task—I utilize in this study.

Measuring the Mental
The most commonly used measure of ToM is the false belief task. This test is primarily
utilized by developmental psychologists. It measures the point at which an individual (typically a
young child) has adequate enough conceptual understanding of BELIEF to know that others can
hold beliefs that differ from their own (Apperly, 2012; Gopnik, 1993). More formally, this is
known as perspective taking. In a paradigm example of the task an object is placed in one of two
opaque containers by the experimenter, and in full view of the participant and a second
“confederate.” The knowledge that the object is located in one container (but not the other) is
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shared by all three individuals. However, the confederate leaves the room and the experimenter
then switches the location of the object to the other container. The experimenter then asks the
participant where the confederate would look for the object when they return to the room. If the
participant indicates that the confederate would look in the original location, despite their
personal knowledge that this is not where the object really is, then they understand that others
can hold beliefs that are different than their own.

Figure 6 Example of a false belief test. Adapted from (Frith, 2003, p. 83)
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These types of tasks are construed as tapping into the “first-order” of ToM, the mindreality distinction (Gopnik, 1993; Reddish, Tok, & Kundt, 2016). However, passing this type of
false belief task only indicates that the BELIEF concept has been acquired. Not why it has been
acquired (Apperly, 2012; Hutto, 2008). Additionally, around 20% of individuals with high
functioning autism (HFA) are still able to pass these tasks (Francesca Happé, 1994; Hutto,
2008). In recent years, false belief tasks not requiring language ability have been developed and
utilized in pre-verbal’s based on looking times and facial reactions (e.g., Buttelmann, Over,
Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2014; Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005). Although interpretation of these
preverbal paradigms is conflicting (c.f., Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Heyes, 2014; Hutto, 2015);
for a full review, see the 2012 special issue of the British Journal of Developmental Psychology
on “Implicit and explicit theory of mind” (Low & Perner, 2012), there appears to be a
substantive qualitative shift in whatever ToM abilities exist once language is acquired (Hutto,
2008). Nevertheless, once the concept of belief has been acquired these tests are of little use in
measuring individual differences in the ToM abilities of neurotypicals over the age of 8.
That individual differences exist in ToM is apparent to anyone who engages in casual
day-to-day conversations (Apperly, 2012). Simply, it can be more or less hard to understand
what other people are thinking. These differences, however, extend beyond the more
fundamental distinction of the first order belief task. Individuals are now capable of having
beliefs about beliefs, also known as the ability to meta-represent (Sperber, 1994). Metarepresentation has also been structured as levels of intentionality (Dunbar, 2004), such that
perspective taking can become increasingly complex (e.g., I think, that my advisor thinks, that
the department head knows, that my advisor believes he forgot to zip up his fly). These situations
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involve tracking intentions/beliefs and as in the example above, they can reach up to four or six
levels (Dunbar, 2004; Gamble, 2013).

Table 2 Levels of intentionality (gratuitously adapted from, Gamble, 2013, p. 23) (original in J.
N. Cole, 2008)
Level 1

Level 2

Ego is selfaware

Ego recognizes
another person’s
belief states as
similar/different
to theirs

My advisor
believes he
forgot to zip his
fly

My advisor
believes that the
department head
thinks he forgot
to zip his fly

Level 3

Level 4
Ego believes that
Ego wants
the group
another person
understands that
to recognizes
another person
Ego’s own belief
recognizes Ego’s
state
own belief states
My advisor
knows that both
My advisor
he and the
desires that the
department head
department head
are aware that
know he forgot
the department
to zip his fly
head thinks his
fly is down

Second order mind reading tasks, such as the “ice-cream man story” (c.f., Perner & Wimmer,
1985; Reddish et al., 2016) require an individual to infer the beliefs of one person about the
knowledge of another. Due to this complexity, these tests are more informative than first order
tasks regarding individual differences in ToM. However, adolescent and adult neurotypicals—
and even some HFA (e.g.,Reddish et al., 2016)—still score at ceiling levels (Bowler, 1992). As
individuals age it becomes harder to separate the intuitive and automatic aspects of mind reading
from those that are at least minimally reflective using these tests. This is due to additional
systems that support increasing social cognitive complexity, such as verbal intelligence quotient,
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executive functioning, and working memory capacity (Apperly, 2011; Apperly & Butterfill,
2009).

Eye Gaze
Another way second order ToM can be measured comes from tracking eye gaze. The
eyes provide a cue toward the object(s)/event, or emotion an individual is tending to, allowing
for the other(s) to share in this intentionality (Tomasello, 2014; Zuberbühler, 2008). Infants
begin using gaze tracking, proper, between 9 to 10 months old (Meltzoff & Brooks, 2007) and
higher gaze following scores predict having significantly more mental state words within the
child’s verbal repertoire at 2 and a half years-of-age (Brooks & Meltzoff, 2015). As young
children gain proficiency tending to gaze direction and the eyes region in general, the eyes elicit
automatic mental state inferences with maturity into adolescence (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright,
Spong, Scahill, & Lawson, 2001) and adulthood (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, &
Plumb, 2001). The reading the mind in the eyes test (RMTE), developed by Baron-Cohen and
colleagues (2001), is a commonly used operational indicator of individual differences in the first
stage of mentalizing, applying the correct mental state concept (e.g., ashamed, alarmed).
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Figure 7 Example of the reading the mind in the eyes test (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright,
Hill, et al., 2001)

The measure consists of 36 cross section pictures of the eye region, which represent a
corresponding mental state. The participant selects the appropriate mental state from 3 other
incorrect “foils” and a sum score is computed. Eye gaze activates the neurological architecture
reliably implicated in ToM tasks (Crespi & Badcock, 2008), such as the superior temporal sulcus
and the medial prefrontal cortex (Calder et al., 2002). Evidence for the stability of these findings
exists developmentally (Moor et al., 2012; Overgaauw, van Duijvenvoorde, Moor, & Crone,
2015) and cross-culturally (Adams et al., 2009). RMTE test has seen use in previous studies on
religion (Caldwell-Harris, Murphy, Velazquez, & McNamara, 2011; Lindeman, SvedholmHäkkinen, & Lipsanen, 2015; Norenzayan, Gervais, & Trzesniewski, 2012).
Other second order ToM tasks involve reading another’s mental state using auditory
information. Toddlers understand that changes in voice pitch can indicate a change in mental
state and goals (e.g., was that a happy scream or an angry one?) (Williamson, Brooks, &
Meltzoff, 2015), as do adults (Golan, Baron-Cohen, Hill, & Rutherford, 2007; Rutherford,
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Baron-Cohen, & Wheelwright, 2002). Much less is known about the relationship between mental
state attribution and auditory mind reading (Williamson et al., 2015) when compared to other
lines of research in ToM. However, measures such as the “Reading the Mind in the Voice”
(Golan et al., 2007) test, which asks individuals to pair verbal sentences with correct emotions,
and experimental paradigms involving similar tasks (Chevallier, Noveck, Happé, & Wilson,
2011), consists in another way individual differences in mentalizing can be measured.
Moving beyond second order intentionality, some tests tapping into individual
differences in mentalizing combine both visual information (particularly eye gaze) and auditory
information. These are known as more “advanced” measures and involve the ability to
understand subtle social concepts such as sarcasm, conflicting emotions, white lies, and
misunderstandings, and to keep track of, for example, what John thinks Susan thinks about him.
The Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition (Dziobek et al., 2006) contains a carefully
scripted movie where individuals are asked to follow the unfolding story line (friends coming
over for dinner). The advantage with this task, as opposed to the previous tests based only on
reading a story, is that the individual is able to draw on perceptual faculties that would normally
be used in any day-to-day situation. They can track information from eye gaze, for example,
facial expression, tone of voice, or even bodily actions in a single paradigm when inferring the
mental states of the actors. Golan’s (2006) “Reading the Mind in Films” task follows a similar
structure, however contains clips from movies that require inferring mental states, as opposed to
a more fluid, diachronically unfolding, story line, such as the Movie for the Assessment of Social
Cognition. While these movie-based tests appear to be a more ecologically valid way to capture
the full range of processes involved in the domain of ToM, they have not been used in the social
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scientific study of religion to date. The reasons for this are somewhat unclear, however they may
be seen as requiring more set-up effort on the part of the experimenter in certain situations.
Other, more commonly used “advanced” tests of mentalizing, do not integrate audio and
visual elements in real time. However, they still capture important nuances in mind reading. For
example, Happe’s (1994) “Strange Stories” test presents short vignettes of social situations
where individuals are probed for their appreciation of social cognitive concepts similar to the
Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition. Other tests, such as the Faux Pas Recognition
Test (Stone, Baron-Cohen, & Knight, 1998), follow a similar conceptual domain of vignettes,
and probe for the individual’s ability to detect inappropriate comments, intentions, beliefs, and
show empathy.
The most widely utilized individual difference measure of mentalizing is the empathizing
quotient (Baron-Cohen, 2002, 2009; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley,
2001). Empathizing is a construct tapping into an individual’s “drive to identify another person’s
emotions and thoughts and to respond to these with an appropriate emotion” (Baron-Cohen,
2002, p. 248). It pertains more to an understanding of mental state attribution, as measured by an
appropriate, perspective taking response, than to applying the appropriate mental state, per se.
However, the former is largely necessary for the latter to be conducted adequately (BaronCohen, 2009). In its various forms, the empathizing quotient ranges from 15 items (Muncer &
Ling, 2006), 25 items (Wakabayashi, Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Goldenfeld, et al., 2006), to
60 items (with 20 foils) in its full version (Baron-Cohen, Richler, Bisarya, Gurunathan, &
Wheelwright, 2003). It has the participant respond to questions such as “I tend to get emotionally
involved with a friend’s problems” (Ibid, p. 373). The empathizing quotient has been used
widely in research on religion (e.g., Banerjee & Bloom, 2014; Lindeman & Lipsanen, 2016;
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Lindeman, Svedholm-Häkkinen, et al., 2015; Norenzayan et al., 2012; Rosenkranz & Charlton,
2013; Willard & Norenzayan, 2013).

Broader Autism Phenotype
Cognitive psychologists interested in the functional organization of the human mind often
utilize populations of individuals with deficits in the domain of interest (c.f., Caldwell-Harris,
2012). Individuals with ASC are the key population of interest for researchers interested in ToM
(Crespi & Badcock, 2008; McCauley, 2011) as mentalizing ability is one of the central deficits
underlying ASC (Baron-Cohen, 2009). All of the previous measures discussed are characterized
by their ability to separate ASC individuals from neurotypicals (NT). ASC traits have been
detected at subclinical levels, as present in the wider population, typically in relatives of ASC
individuals. This is known as the broader autism phenotype (BAP) (Losh & Piven, 2007). Aside
from low sociality (characteristic of mentalizing deficits), the BAP also consists of pragmatic
language deficits and rigidity (Baron-Cohen & Hammer, 1997; Hurley, Losh, Parlier, Reznick, &
Piven, 2007).
Often paired with the empathizing quotient in studies on religion, the autism quotient
(Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, et al., 2001) was the first scale designed to specifically
measure the traits associated with the BAP. The full version consists of 50 questions, short
version only 10 (Allison, Auyeung, & Baron-Cohen, 2012), with 5 subscales covering “attention
to detail, attention switching, communication, imagination, and social” aspects of the BAP.
However, the communication, imagination, and social subscales theoretically overlap with one
another in what I would best describe as ToM-social cognition domain related based on my
discussion of ToM up to this point. And while the autism quotient has 5 subscales, its use in
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studies on religious belief have only ever reported the overall sum score to date (e.g., Banerjee &
Bloom, 2014; Caldwell-Harris, Murphy, et al., 2011; Norenzayan et al., 2012). Whether or not
the autism quotient has an appropriate factor structure for research on religious belief remains an
open question.
A recent attempt at capturing BAP characteristics by Hurley, Losh, Parlier, Reznick, and
Piven (2007) has resulted in the construction of the BAP Questionnaire (BAPQ). It has three
subscales: Aloof personality, rigid personality, and pragmatic language. The content of these
three subscales appear to match up fairly well with the autism quotient subscales, however
questions regarding imagination are absent from the BAPQ. Of particular interest, the “Aloof
personality” subscale operationalizes the social deficit aspect of ASC, which Hurley et al. (2007,
p. 1681) define as “lack of interest in or enjoyment of social interaction.” However, the BAPQ
has proven psychometrically superior to the autism quotient (Ingersoll, Hopwood, Wainer, &
Brent Donnellan, 2011). The Aloof invites participants to rate on a six point Likert scale (1, Vary
rarely—Very often, 6) how much each of 12 statements applies to themselves. The content of the
statements range from how much the individual enjoys social interaction (e.g., “I like being
around other people”), to how much the individual feels they are connecting in social
engagements (e.g., I feel like I am really connecting with other people”) (Hurley et al., 2007).
Although scores on the Aloof (and the autism quotient) should correlate highly with measures
such as Baron-Cohen’s empathizing quotient, due to the relationship between mentalizing ability
and social interaction, the Aloof is not a measure of mentalizing. Nonetheless, it necessarily
captures the downstream effects of lower mentalizing without suggesting that each and every
low Aloof score is sufficiently explained via lower mentalizing. In other words, lower desire for
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social engagement can stem from a variety of domains, only one of which may be variations in
ToM. The BAPQ has not yet been utilized in a study regarding religious belief.
Other methods available tapping into higher level aspects of ToM concern narrative
evaluation coding for intentionality, teleology, use of emotion and mental state words (Bamberg
& Damrad-Frye, 1991), negative propositions (Losh & Capps, 2003), and causal connecting
phrases (Chakrabarti et al., 2009).
All of the measures discussed here have two key points in common, their relationships to,
and predictions for ASC and NT’s, as well as ToM in these two groups.
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CHAPTER V.
THEORY OF MIND: CONVERGENCE AND VARIATION

Variation and convergence in any complex socio-cognitive trait or ability is, at some
level, a to-be expected outcome of multiple factors. In this chapter, I provide a near exhaustive
review of sources of possible variation in ToM. I do this in order to suggest, that, with as many
possible ways as ToM can vary—having absolutely nothing to do with ASC—that ASC should
only be seen as a peripheral concern in the relationship between mentalizing, ToM, social
cognition, etc., and supernatural belief. I first discuss sources of this variation within the social
brain, then, I draw attention to occurrences of convergence and apply the relevance of that
literature to briefly touch on the theoretical strength of Leslie’s (1994b) ToM and the role of the
SP in developing variation. Next, I introduce the “social brain” and “social disorders,” briefly
discussing the case of schizophrenia and providing a more in-depth look at ASC and the BAP.
This research directly relates to the measures utilized in the current study. Finally, I discuss a
promising proposal from evolutionary psychiatry suggesting variation in ToM functioning is
“normal” (also characterized by psychoses individuals), existing as a continuum of the “social
brain.”

Cross-Cultural Convergence and Variation in Theory of Mind
Influences on variation in ToM development come from multiple sources, both
environmental as well as biological. Multiple brain regions are implicated in different aspects of
mindreading, however there is evidence of “core regions” (Brüne & Brüne-Cohrs, 2006;
Carrington & Bailey, 2009; Deen, Koldewyn, Kanwisher, & Saxe, 2015; Rice & Redcay, 2015).
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False belief tasks tap into an important milestone in ToM development, the ability to
deploy belief-desire concepts, ToM consists of much more than the ability to pass a false belief
task (Apperly, 2012; Boyer & Barrett, 2005). Nonetheless, studies using the false belief task
have shown remarkable convergence on the developmental trajectory of this conceptual change
across and within cultures (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). Despite the overall evidence of
false belief understanding, for example among Chinese and Americans (Liu, Wellman, Tardif, &
Sabbagh, 2008, p. 529), the course of development for theory of mind necessarily includes
“specific experiential factors” that may affect the time table and order of developing specific
concepts.
For example, during narrative exchanges with their children, Chinese mothers tend to
emphasize behavior whereas American mothers emphasize thoughts and emotions (Doan &
Wang, 2010). This suggestion is telling in light of recent studies extending and combining false
belief paradigms with more nuanced measures of conceptual emphasis in order to probe for
variation between cultures. Children from so-called “individualistic” societies, for example, such
as Turkey (Etel & Yagmurlu, 2015) & the United States (Wellman, Fang, Liu, Zhu, & Liu,
2006), and Australia (Shahaeian, Nielsen, Peterson, & Slaughter, 2014; Shahaeian, Peterson,
Slaughter, & Wellman, 2011) tend to develop an understanding of diversity of beliefs first (i.e.,
that people can believe different things about the same situation). Children from so-called
“collectivistic” societies, however, such as Iran (Shahaeian et al., 2014; Shahaeian et al., 2011),
China (Wellman et al., 2006), and possibly Pakistan (Nawaz, Hanif, & Lewis, 2015), tend to
develop understandings of knowledge access prima facie (i.e., that something could be true, but
that others might not know this). However, one study, by O’Reilly and Peterson (2014)
contrasting Aboriginal Australians (presumably collectivist) with Anglo-Australians (presumably
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individualistic), found both groups to be similar in diverse belief emphasis. Thus, in light of
O’Reilly and Peterson (2014) and Doan and Wang’s (2010) study, variations in the development
of conceptual emphasis may have more to do with parenting styles than an individualist vs.
collectivist divide, although more research is needed.
Despite the convergence, there is evidence for cultural variation in passing false belief
tasks. In a study with Samoan children, from within a culture discouraging discussions of mental
states, Mayer and Trauble, (2013) found false belief performance improves only gradually, with
the majority succeeding after the age of 8years old (Callaghan et al., 2005). Mayer and Trauble
(2015) found Samoan children failed the false belief task and did not perform above chance on a
true belief task in comparison to German children. Ahn and Miller (2012) found that Korean
children out performed US children across 3 false belief tests, and variations in “self-concept”
were also identified. In a study indicating variation within Western culture, British children
outperformed their matched Italian counterparts on 1st and 2nd order false belief tasks, although
their performance understanding mixed emotions was similar (Lecce & Hughes, 2010).
Additionally, Naito and Koyama (2006) identified a developmental lag in the ability for Japanese
children to pass the false belief task based on comparisons with western children. Since ToM is a
learning mechanism, these differences, likely reflect expected developmental variation in false
belief understanding trajectories rather than any ground breaking evidence that the core
processes involved in ToM is substantively culture dependent. All “cultures” produce children
capable of detecting agency and reading minds.
Convergence on core aspects of ToM measured by developmental milestones, such as
passing a false belief task, are unsurprising if ToM has at least a minimally innate basis (BaronCohen, 1998, 1999; Scholl & Leslie, 1999, 2001). Some features should reliably converge
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around core aspects of cognitive architecture regardless of culture (Sperber & Hirschfeld, 1999,
2004). As executive function capacity matures, ToM will inevitably be able to process
increasingly complex representations (Carruthers, 2016; Leslie, 2000). While the intuitions to
deploy the mind reading process are universal, these intuitions can be framed in a myriad of
ways by higher level, reflective processes (Baumard & Boyer, 2013; Coleman & Hood, 2015).
Since ToM is the core mechanism enabling learning about beliefs and desires, which eventually
form customs and traditions, the adult ToM entails a great deal of cultural “filling-in” (Apperly,
2013; Heyes & Frith, 2014). For example, if you travel to Central or South America and are
unaware of the customary “cheek kissing” greeting, depending on the context, you may end up
thinking some strange thoughts.
It is still unclear what is accounting for some of these cross-cultural differences. Overall,
the research in this area is likely to be affected by many unobserved variables, which may have
less to do with “culture” and more to do with sampling and measurement. For example, many
cross-cultural studies fail to take into account that false belief test performance can vary with
family size and bilingualism (Slaughter & Perez‐Zapata, 2014). Nonetheless, cultural “filling-in”
does occur, typically at the direction of learning algorithms embedded within a particular module
(H. C. Barrett, 2015; Boyer, 2010), or by changing the in-put information for a mechanism, as
“what goes through our minds changes our minds” (Morin, 2016, p. 456). For example, an
American four-year-old who views her parents praying each night may be enculturated into the
idea that the mind is porous and can be influenced by the stray thoughts of other people (c.f.,
Luhrmann, 2011b); A child from Thailand is likely to develop the idea that minds can “wander”
(c.f., Cassaniti & Luhrmann, 2011) upon hearing his parents discuss that their neighbor’s
maladjusted mind may be controlling another individual in the community. Research supporting
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this enculturation account has been recently published suggesting that a child’s religious
background influences attributing awareness to God (Lane, Evans, Brink, & Wellman, 2016).
The processes behind cultural learning come online at roughly the same time (Legare & Nielsen,
2015) as the selection processor begins to function as a mechanism of selective attention (Leslie,
2000). This allows for variation in ToM.

Environmental influences on the Development of Theory of Mind
Hughes, Jaffee, Happe, Taylor, Caspi, and Moffitt’s (2005, p. 356) twin study sample of
1,116 sixty-month-old twin pairs in England, who were administered a wide range of ToM tasks,
found that “environmental factors explained the majority of the variance in ToM performance.
Theory of mind competency can be boosted a number of ways. Across five experiments, Kidd
and Castano (2013) demonstrated that reading literary fiction temporarily improves affective
ToM. Additional research suggests reading metaphor (Bowes & Katz, 2015), playing video
games with virtual narratives (Bormann & Greitemeyer, 2015) and fictional TV dramas also
produce similar enhancements. Controlling for age, gender, vocabulary, and parental income,
Mar, Tackett, and Moore (2010) found that engagement with storybooks and children’s movies
predicts ToM development. Educational research with preschool children makes clear the
importance of storytelling and sharing for the development of ToM (Curenton, 2011; Fernández,
2013) and has begun to identify ways teachers can increase aspects of ToM in the classroom
(Ziv, Smadja, & Aram, 2015); for a review of studies indicating that Training ToM and
executive function through school related tasks can boost performance, see (Kloo & Perner,
2008). The use of mentalistic words in caregiver-child dyads (and quality of interaction; c.f.,

46

Slaughter, Peterson, & Mackintosh, 2007) is not only correlated with ToM development
(Bretherton & Beeghly, 1982), but can predict its developmental stage (Doan & Wang, 2010).
A common denominator in these studies is the use of mental state words embedded in a
narrative. Depending on the extent to which the linguistic practices within a given culture utilize
mentalistic terms (belief-desire words) in their vocabulary, this may influence an individual’s
understanding of other minds (for a review, see Lillard, 1998; Vinden, 1999).
Variations in ToM have also been identified due to poverty and lifestyle conditions. In
assessing trauma experienced in childhood with a sample of over 5000 adults, Germine, Dunn,
McLaughlin, and Smoller (2015) found that exposure to adverse circumstances, such as abuse,
was related to variations in ToM. Furthermore, there is evidence that emotion recognition in
maltreated children is also impaired (Cicchetti, Rogosch, Maughan, Toth, & Bruce, 2003;
Curenton, 2011; Moulson, Fox, Zeanah, & Nelson, 2009; Pollak, Cicchetti, Hornung, & Reed,
2000) and in addition, the development of PTSD stemming from childhood abuse in females is
linked with slower emotion recognition of complex mental states (Nazarov et al., 2014). Social
and environmental factors, such as exposure to various hydrocarbons (e.g., tobacco smoke or
neurotoxins) has, perhaps unsurprisingly, been shown to predict reduced cognitive development
(Lovasi et al., 2014) and may contribute to variations in the social brain (Crespi, 2016; Nowack,
Wittsiepe, Kasper-Sonnenberg, Wilhelm, & Schölmerich, 2015). Studies indicate that alterations
in symbolic play, which is another hallmark of a developing ToM (Leslie, 1987), can occur in
infants with prenatal substance abuse exposure when compared to their socio-economic matched
counterparts (Beckwith et al., 1994) or even when compared to similarly matched preterm
toddlers (Rodning, Beckwith, & Howard, 1989). Nonetheless, economic disadvantages may also
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contribute to variation in ToM and social cognitive competencies (see, (for a review, see Heberle
& Carter, 2015) for a review).
Kuntoro, Saraswati, Peterson, and Slaughter (2013) found that lower economic status
individuals in Indonesia lag behind both middle class Indonesians and Australians in knowledge
access and emotion concealment. In another study finding a distinct socioeconomic advantage,
Shatz, Diesendruck, Martinez-Bexk, and Akar (2003) also found that the linguistic markers for
false belief in the Turkish and Spanish languages delivered an advantage when compared to
English and Portuguese preschoolers. Cole and Mitchell (1998, p. 191) administered a false
belief test and other measures of representational understanding to test for the ability to both
appreciate deception and behave deceptively in young British children, finding socioeconomic
status strongly linked to performance in understanding this representational capacity and a later
study has yielded similar results (K. Cole & Mitchell, 2000).
Over the course of two longitudinal studies with Australian children, one with a
predominantly upper-class sample and another with a more socioeconomic diverse sample,
McAlister and Peterson (2007; 2013) found having more siblings predicts better ToM ability
across times 1 and 2, but speculate the socioeconomic status of their sample may have played a
role (see also Perner, Ruffman, & Leekam, 1994; Ruffman, Perner, Naito, Parkin, & Clements,
1998). Using more advanced tests of ToM involving actively reasoning about mental states in a
sample of middle childhood aged children, Kennedy, Lagattuta, and Sayfan (2015) (however, no
socioeconomic data was reported), and Wright and Mahfoud (2012), who also found a
relationship based on number of friends, find further support for the number of siblings one has
positively scaffolding ToM development and richness.
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Conversely and on one hand, other studies, such as (Cutting & Dunn, 1999) find a strong
relationship between socioeconomic status and false belief performance see also (Guiberson &
Rodriguez, 2013), but fail to find any sibling effects. Whereas on the other hand, studies also
find no relationship between passing false belief tasks and socioeconomic status only (K. Cole &
Mitchell, 2000), or fail to find relationships between false belief tasks, socioeconomic status, and
sibling effects (Shahaeian, 2015) (in Iranian children with 3 socioeconomic levels). A recent
study with schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, and psychoses patients found a negative
relationship between number of older siblings and ToM performance (Murray et al., 2015). This
effect has been identified in ASC individuals even after controlling for age, verbal mental age,
executive function, and severity of autism (O’Brien, Slaughter, & Peterson, 2011); but for
contradicting results, see Matthews, Goldberg, and Lukowski (2013). From a biological
perspective, motherly care is expensive and interaction time with each child decreases as the
number of children in a particular family increases. Thus, both patterns may reflect the
magnitude of maternal investment costs within a multi-child home associated with ASC and
psychotic spectrum disorders, however (Crespi & Badcock, 2008).
Overall, if, when, or precisely how, socioeconomic status may affect ToM development
remains a muddled question. However, evidence is more clear that siblings do contribute
positively to ToM in typically developing children by providing expertise in mental state
discourse. The relationship between maltreatment in childhood and problematic variations in
ToM is also robust, if not intuitive (i.e., if you verbally or physically abuse children this has
psychological consequences). Engagement with other resources scaffolding ToM, such as
narrative fiction, show temporary benefits, however more research is needed to confirm this and
shed light on possible cumulative effects.
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Day-to-Day Variations in Mindreading
Social perception can be influenced by top down effects, based on context, person
specific knowledge, and previous interactions (Malle, 2004; Teufel, Fletcher, & Davis, 2010). In
men, making a fist can influence how powerful individuals perceive themselves to be (i.e.,
internally directed ToM reflection) (Schubert & Koole, 2009). Social judgments and decisionmaking can be influenced by haptic sensation (Ackerman, Nocera, & Bargh, 2010). Social
exchanges involving money and the context of the exchange affect males and females’ responses
on the RMTE (Ridinger & McBride, 2015). Not only do individuals show an in-group bias
towards perceiving same culture facial features (Krumhuber, Swiderska, Tsankova, Kamble, &
Kappas, 2015) and decoding mental states (Adams et al., 2009), but this preference is also
demonstrated in situations involving political affiliation and perceived threat (Hackel, Looser, &
Van Bavel, 2014). However, out-groups may also be ascribed mentality differently based on the
motivations of the perceiver. Waytz and Young (2014) found that motivations driven by
affiliation emphasize emotions and feelings in out-group mind attribution compared with
effectance motivation, emphasizing agency, planning, and intentionality. Given mind attribution
plays such a mediating role in intergroup relations (J. L. Barrett, 2011) it should also function in
the domain on morality.
Young and Waytz (2013, p. 93) have argued that the “primary” function of mind
attribution and mental state reasoning is “for moral cognition and behavior” (see also Gray,
Young, & Waytz, 2012). The eyes play a pivotal role in the ascription of mentality, eyes = minds
(Baron-Cohen, 1995). Simply placing googily eye spots innocuously by a computer screen can
increase prosociality (Bateson, Nettle, & Roberts, 2006; Haley & Fessler, 2005) and a poster
featuring eyes, but not flowers, cuts lunchroom littering behavior by half in one study (Ernest-
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Jones, Nettle, & Bateson, 2011). Compared to the nose, when the eyes are missing from pictures
of faces, individuals find these faces as uncanny and soulless (Schein & Gray, 2015). By
activating our ToM system eye spots contribute to day-to-day variations in moral cognition.

Affiliation, Empathy, and Coordination
Affiliation, empathy, and coordination lay at the heart of ToM (Seyfarth & Cheney,
2013). Perceiving scenes of affiliation or isolation engage core neural regions of social cognition
(Beadle, Yoon, & Gutchess, 2012). Anxiety is induced whenever strangers meet, however
sharing in a brief cooperative experience (playing the video game Rock Band) amongst complete
strangers’ increases empathy, trust, and affiliation (Martin et al., 2015). The motor performance
coupling between two individuals engaged in a joint action task is greatly facilitated when
preceded by a shared musical listening experience (Lang et al., 2015). Simple repetitive
behavior, such as tapping, synchronizes between dyads based on their ability to predict the action
of another (Konvalinka, Vuust, Roepstorff, & Frith, 2010). For spectators of some “extreme”
rituals such as firewalking, their heartbeat synchs up with those of the fire-walkers (Konvalinka
et al., 2011), and even being a mere spectator to the event can be more emotionally exhausting
than actually participating (Fischer & Xygalatas, 2014). Behavioral synchronicity is one avenue
that can tune our minds with the minds of others (Baimel, Severson, Baron, & Birch, 2015).

Clinical Variations in Theory of Mind
The etiology behind possible variation in ToM is expansive. As one unique human trait is
a hyper social brain (Gowlett, Gamble, & Dunbar, 2012), a normally working ToM mediates all
of what we know to be our social lives. Disorders such as Autism and psychosis may represent
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the extreme polar ends in a continuum of the social brain (Crespi & Badcock, 2008). ToM
functioning is critically diminished in autism spectrum individuals (and unaffected siblings show
slight decreases; (Baron-Cohen, 1995, 2009; Frith, 2003), but appears amplified in cases of
psychosis (Crespi & Badcock, 2008). However, from a clinical perspective variation in ToM can
be affected by a number of mental health related concerns and disorders. These psychiatric
disorders are the extreme ends along a continuum of typical ToM functioning.
In typical healthy individuals, ToM ability decreases with normal aging (for a metaanalytic review, see Henry, Phillips, Ruffman, & Bailey, 2013). Both Alzheimer’s and dementia
patients show impairments in emotion recognition (Henry et al., 2013; for a meta-analytic
review, see Sandoz, Démonet, & Fossard, 2014). In other neurodegenerative disorders, such as
Huntington’s disease, diminished ToM ability has been identified in clinically diagnosed, and to
a lesser degree, preclinical cases (Adjeroud et al., 2016; for a meta-analysis, see Bora,
Walterfang, & Velakoulis, 2015). Parkinson’s patients also show noticeable deficits in ToM
(Bora et al., 2015; for a meta-analysis, see Péron et al., 2010). Specific impairments in ToM,
separate from executive function, have been found in Fibromyalgia suffers (Di Tella et al.,
2015). Patients with multiple sclerosis demonstrate trouble with sarcasm and lie detection
compared with controls (Genova, Cagna, Chiaravalloti, DeLuca, & Lengenfelder, 2016).
Individuals with frontal and temporal lobe epilepsy, as well as children suffering from
generalized seizures, have been identified with ToM impairments (for review and meta-analysis,
see Stewart, Catroppa, & Lah, 2016). Additionally, ToM variations can be found in
schizophrenia patients (for a review, see Bora, Yucel, & Pantelis, 2009), unaffected siblings (Ho
et al., 2015) and relatives of schizophrenic patients (Mohnke et al., 2016), Borderline personality
disorder (Vaskinn et al., 2015), psychopathy (Baez et al., 2015; Sharp & Vanwoerden, 2013),
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depression (Cusi, Nazarov, MacQueen, & McKinnon, 2013; Zobel et al., 2010), comorbid (Hezel
& McNally, 2014) and non-comorbid social anxiety disorder (Washburn, Wilson, Roes, Rnic, &
Harkness, 2016). Both bipolar disorder type I and II show impairments in mental state reasoning
(but not mental state decoding), however this effect may be state dependent, being expressed
only during active episodes of psychological impairment, and also depend on other cognitive
functions and possibly psychotropic medication (Ioannidi, Konstantakopoulos, Sakkas, & Oulis,
2015; Martino, Strejilevich, Fassi, Marengo, & Igoa, 2011). In one study, chronic somatoform
pain sufferers demonstrated lower ToM ability (Zunhammer, Halski, Eichhammer, & Busch,
2015), however similar to bipolar disorder, this may have been due to psychotropic medications
as well. Individuals with dissociative identity disorder have trouble integrating the narrative self
as stable and coherent across time (Seligman & Kirmayer, 2008).
Many neuropsychiatric disorders suggest a links to increased inflammation. Recently
researchers have been able to temporarily induce inflammation (Moieni, Irwin, Jevtic, Breen, &
Eisenberger, 2015), finding it impairs emotion recognition on the RMTE task. Deficits have also
been identified in children with specific language impairments and attention deficit hyperactivity
disorder (for meta-analyses, see Nilsson & de López, 2016; Uekermann et al., 2010) as well as
preschool children with mild (Bellerose, Bernier, Beaudoin, Gravel, & Beauchamp, 2015) and
severe traumatic brain injury (Ryan et al., 2015). Individuals with alcohol use disorder show
impaired ToM (Bosco, Capozzi, Colle, Marostica, & Tirassa, 2014), and one study found half of
recently detoxified alcohol dependent individuals showed impairments relative to controls
(Maurage, de Timary, Tecco, Lechantre, & Samson, 2015). Emotion recognition is impaired in
active methamphetamine abusers (Kim, Kwon, & Chang, 2011), methamphetamine abusers with
6 months’ abstinence (Henry, Mazur, & Rendell, 2009), and polysubstance abusers in general
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(Fernández-Serrano, Pérez-García, & Verdejo-García, 2011). Child sex offenders show slight
ToM impairments when inferring the mental states of other adults when compared to controls
(Elsegood & Duff, 2010; Ward, Keenan, & Hudson, 2000), however do not differ from controls
when inferring the mental states of children (Elsegood & Duff, 2010).

The Social Brain Continuum and Social “Disorders”
Psychiatric “disorders” do not represent unique, sui generis, puzzles to cognitive science
informed by evolutionary theory. Risk alleles for these disorders would not be favored by
evolution if they were solely maladaptive (Crespi, 2016). In providing the ultimate collection of
adaptations for homo sapiens (Dunbar, 2009; Gamble, 2013) the social brain entails evolutionary
tradeoffs. Autism spectrum and the psychotic spectrum represent two opposing end points on a
continuum of the social brain (Baron-Cohen, 2009; Baron-Cohen & Belmonte, 2005; Crespi,
2011a, 2016; Crespi & Badcock, 2008; Crespi & Go, 2015).

Figure 8 Social brain continuum. Reproduced from (Crespi & Badcock, 2008, p. 257)
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This is the “cost” of the social brain (i.e., evolutionary tradeoffs). Furthermore, from a biological
perspective the social brain represents an expression of the genetic battle field for warfare
between two opposing yet intermingling genomic imprints: Prototypically male and female traits.
The autism spectrum and psychotic spectrum are not underpinned by any single gene
(Crespi, 2011a; Verhoeff, 2014). Any notion that there are genes directly for these etiologies is
extremely misleading under this evolutionary model. Ultimately, however, there are genes for
the social brain. Extreme dysregulation in this brain, as manifest in AS and PS disorders, anchor
opposing ends of a social brain continuum. Genetic evidence supports this account, indicating
that at four gene loci, genes deletions can predispose an individual towards one end of the
continuum while duplications may predispose them to the other end (Crespi, Stead, & Elliot,
2010).

Psychotic-Spectrum
The “psychotic-spectrum” captures a whole suite of symptomologies associated with
variation in the social brain. For example, hallucinations, delusions, self-rumination, and magical
ideation are present in schizophrenia, depressive disorders, and bipolar disorder (Crespi &
Badcock, 2008). These conditions predispose individuals to over detect agency and increase
mind perception (Gervais, 2013b) such as hearing voices, thought insertion, or paranoia. The
effect of different psychoses on ToM tasks can vary and is heavily debated. In schizophrenic
disorders, ToM may either be impaired or amplified (for a review, see Brüne, 2005).
The precise data on the gender distribution for schizophrenia is somewhat unclear,
however, males have a “higher presence of negative and disorganized symptoms…” and females
have a “higher prevalence of affective symptoms,” as well as faring better overall in severity
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(Ochoa, Usall, Cobo, Labad, & Kulkarni, 2012, p. 2). Interestingly, studies suggest that
questionnaires used to measure the BAP closely resemble the negative social and disorganized
dimensions of schizotypy (Crespi, 2011b). Testing for schizophrenia spectrum serum biomarkers
has demonstrated effectiveness in differentiating between NT controls and schizophrenia roughly
60-75% of the time. This is rather weak, but when differentiating schizophrenia from ASC, the
prediction rate shoots up to 96% (Schwarz et al., 2012). Thus, there are characteristics of
psychoses that partially overlap with the characteristics present in ASC.

Autism-Spectrum
Although variations in ToM can be found in a variety of clinical disorders, a deficit in
ToM was identified as the defining characteristic for individuals diagnosed with autism in the
1980’s (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). Up until this point, the underlying
mechanism(s) responsible for autism eluded developmental psychologists since Kanner (1943)
first outlined its diagnostic criteria 73 years ago. Autism is not underpinned by any single gene
or neurocognitive structure. Instead, it represents the combined influence of any system
responsible for development of the human social brain (Crespi, 2011b, 2016). The diversity
behind the symptomology of autism gave way to what is known as the “autism spectrum” (AS)
(autism spectrum continuum, ASC) (Verhoeff, 2014). Individuals on the ASC can be typified by
impairments “in understanding and coping with the social environment” (Baron-Cohen et al.,
1985, p. 38) as well as a proclivity for narrow interests, repetitive behavior, and attention to
detail (Baron-Cohen, 2002, 2009; Frith, 2003, 2012). These two areas of variation (counting the
latter description as a second cluster) differ dramatically depending on where on falls on the
ASC and have wide ranging impacts on the day-to-day social life of ASC individuals.

56

The main criteria for the low functioning autism (LFA) is a general deficit in intelligence.
Typically, the intelligence quotient cutoff for this classification is below an 80. This negative
variation in intelligence compounds and amplifies the potentially deleterious effects of an
already diminished ToM. Towards the low end of the ASC, when an individual has trouble
understanding intentionality, it may be hard to learn much of anything, as communicative acts
that are meant for you (e.g. Sally this is how you tie your shoe laces) are unable to cognitively
register as anything other than a random action in one’s environment (e.g. Sally hears speaking
and sees someone moving). In this situation agency can be detected, but it does not cue up the
“intentional stance,” to borrow from Dennett (1987). Thus Sally is unable to learn many of the
life skills that would be acquired by individuals who are capable of deciphering the intentions
behind a particular action, to varying degrees. Repetitive, stereotyped behavior, specific interests,
and an aversion to interruptions in routine are also particularly exaggerated in LFA (BaronCohen, 1995, 2009; Caldwell-Harris, 2012; Crespi & Go, 2015; Hurley et al., 2007).
The high functioning end of the ASC is characterized by average or above average
intelligence, while retaining less extreme variations in ToM and mechanistic cognition etc. than
are found in LFA (Baron-Cohen, 2009; Caldwell-Harris, 2012). Whereas an individual with LFA
may be easily detected in a casual conversation by a neurotypical with little ASC knowledge,
provided the LFA impairment is not so severe as to impeded any communication, the average
person is unlikely to detect a HFA. Interestingly, such “narrow” interests and mechanistic
cognition may actually contribute to an everyday advantage for HFA operating in contexts where
attention to detail and analytic thinking are of importance (Baron-Cohen, 2002). Collectively,
these behaviors are termed “systemizing” (Baron-Cohen, 2009; Caldwell-Harris & Jordan,
2014).

57

Autism is four times more likely to affect males than females. When autism does occur
in females, its expression is typically more severe (Baron-Cohen & Belmonte, 2005; Crespi &
Badcock, 2008). Similarly, Asperger’s Syndrome, which maintains an etiology identical to HFA
(but without the delayed linguistic development) is nine times more likely to occur in males than
females (Baron-Cohen & Belmonte, 2005). Characteristics of the autism spectrum, such as
deficits in mentalizing and social communication combined with the strengths of systemizing
and attention to detail (Baron-Cohen, 2009; Frith & Frith, 2010) also appear to characterize BAP
males in the general population (Hurley et al., 2007; Sasson et al., 2013). For example, females
consistently outperform males when inferring mental states from the eye regions (for a metaanalysis, see Kirkland, Peterson, Baker, Miller, & Pulos, 2013) as well as consistently scoring
higher than males on the empathizing quotient (Baron-Cohen, 2009). During infancy, males cry
longer and more often than females (Baron-Cohen, 1995). In further support of the “maleness” of
ASC, males and females with autism perform similarly on both of these measures (Baron-Cohen
et al., 2015).
Adult males demonstrate greater emotional reactivity to pictures without humans while
females show the opposite pattern (Althaus et al., 2014). On average, and at only 24 hours old,
before cultural effects may show influence, male neonates orient their gaze more towards
physical objects, whereas females tend to focus on faces and people (Connellan, Baron-Cohen,
Wheelwright, Batki, & Ahluwalia, 2000; Geary, 2010). As children, males are drawn more
towards mechanical, construction, and wheeled toys, whereas females show more varied choice
in toys (for a review, see Hines, 2011; Jadva, Hines, & Golombok, 2010). These differences are
not purely the result of enculturation as these same sex differences in toy preferences are also
found in young chimpanzees (Kahlenberg & Wrangham, 2010) and rhesus monkeys (Hassett,
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Siebert, & Wallen, 2008). Rat, Meadow Vole, Rhesus monkey, and deer mice, males all show a
spatial navigation advantage (c.f., C. M. Jones, Braithwaite, & Healy, 2003). In humans,
compared to females, it is well established that males show enhanced mental and spatial rotation
(Cosmides & Tooby, 2013; Kaufman, 2007; Parsons et al., 2004). This likely reflects the
recurring division and specialization of labor throughout hominid evolutionary history, with
males5 primarily tracking and hunting prey across long distances and unfamiliar terrain
(Cosmides & Tooby, 2013); studies of hunter gatherers also confirm this division of labor
(Whiten & Erdal, 2012). Tracking and hunting require fairly accurate navigational skills and
attention to detail that is rapid, otherwise one risks losing the trail and dinner (Cosmides &
Tooby, 2013; Liebenberg, 2006). On tasks measuring performance in attending to detail, such as
the embedded figures test, which requires one to locate a “hidden” shape embedded within a
larger geometric shape (Francesca Happé, 2013) non-clinical populations with autistic traits
(Russell-Smith, Maybery, Bayliss, & Sng, 2012), TD males (Baron-Cohen, 2002), and children
and adults with autism (Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1997; Keehn et al., 2009; Schlooz & Hulstijn,
2014) show an advantage. When this test was given to ASC and TD participants under an fMRI
scan, females demonstrate more activity in the Posterior parietal cortex then males, and both
males and females show more activity than the ASC group, suggesting basic perceptual visual
processing is attenuated in ASC (Manjaly et al., 2007). Despite this attenuation, however, ASC
groups still outperform TD’s and fMRI studies also suggest atypical activation of a number of
brain regions when completing the executive function test for ASC, even in their non-clinical

5

Although not directly related to the present discussion, it is important to point out that there is a domain specific
female advantage in spatial memory for the absolute location of plant foods. This likely reflects the recurring
specialization of women as primarily foragers, tasked with remembering the specific locations of edibles for
gathering (Cosmides & Tooby, 2013). Gathering has proved important to human evolution (Buss, 2016), yet it is an
under researched topic in hunter gatherer studies and due to the nature of, and materials required for, gathering, the
archaeological evidence is quite literally not set in stone (Whiten & Erdal, 2012).
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siblings (Spencer et al., 2012). Additionally, performance on the test in childhood has
demonstrated the ability to predict the severity of repetitive behavior in adolescence (Eussen,
Gool, Louwerse, Verhulst, & Greaves-Lord, 2016). Two-year-old children with ASC do not
utilize biological motion cues (measured as a light point display) the way typically developing
children do, instead utilizing cues from their physical contingencies (Klin, Lin, Gorrindo,
Ramsay, & Jones, 2009). Compared to the looking times for images of social interaction in
toddlers ages 12 to 43 months old, looking at geometric patterns for more than 70% of the time
almost guarantees a diagnosis of autism (Pierce, Conant, Hazin, Stoner, & Desmond, 2011).
Males in general and both high functioning females and males on the ASC demonstrate superior
ability in systemizing.

Systemizing
Systemizing is a cognitive style driven by preference for the identification and
manipulation of rule based systems (Baron-Cohen, 2009). It involves detecting regularities and
extracting behavioral rules in the form of “If I do x, then y happens” (Baron-Cohen, 2002).
Quantifying and breaking wholes into various parts that can be manipulated and tested are key
features of systemizing. Systemizing is a prototypical activity for males and male systemizers
show positive correlations of activation in resting state activity between the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex and the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, while the opposite is true for females
(Takeuchi et al., 2014). Almost like the ends of two magnets, the systemizer is attracted to
systems. Baron-Cohen (2010) gives examples of some of the more prevalent types of systems;
abstract systems (e.g., musical notation), social systems (e.g., business management hierarchy),
mechanical systems (e.g., car engine), natural systems (e.g., weather patterns), numerical
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systems (e.g., calendar), and motoric systems (e.g., throwing a Frisbee). Thus systemizing is,
ipso facto, folk physical ability. It is concerned with causality and interactions with objects
displaying non-agentive movement (Paganini & Gaido, 2013). Systemizing is useful for
repairing your old video cassette player or changing the breaks on your car, but much less so
when trying to infer the intentions and desires of another person. For intuitive understandings of
the mental state of others, empathizing works best.

Empathizing
Empathizing is a cognitive style encompassing much of the domain of social cognition, it
involves “the attribution of mental states to others, and an appropriate affective response to the
other’s affective state” (Baron-Cohen, 2002, p. 248). In contrast to systemizing, empathizing
allows you to predict the behavior of other biological agents and “requires an imaginative leap in
the dark” (Ibid), as inferences are made into the unseen mind, often in the absence of enough
data. Females are more likely to be high empathizers than males (Baron-Cohen, 2009, 2010).
Studies also suggest a female advantage on the ability to pass false belief tasks (Baron-Cohen,
2002; Charman, Ruffman, & Clements, 2002). Taking into account the previous two sections, the
female advantage for mental expertise is clear.

Systemizing and Empathizing
Males typically outnumber females in jobs or activities that entailing systemizing, such as
the sciences (Baron-Cohen, 2002). This occurrence could be attributed to outright male
dominance and control of resources, discouraging females from being motivated to engage in
these activities. Interestingly, one cross-cultural study in four countries found that systemizing
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explained 27% of the variance in motivation to learn science, while gender explained only 1.5%
(Zeyer et al., 2013). Subsequent studies have strengthened the relationship between systemizing,
male gender, and the specific interests found in the sciences (Byrd-Craven, Massey, Calvi, &
Geary, 2015), however, others suggested that while the previous relationships hold, the
empathizing and systemizing quotient may not affect performance in these disciplines
(Morsanyi, Primi, Handley, Chiesi, & Galli, 2012). When differences in the empathizing and
systemizing quotient are plotted between the sciences and the humanities, individuals within
science, technology, engineering and math based fields score higher on systemizing, individuals
within the humanities show stronger empathizing, and the expected sex differences can even be
found within each field (Billington, Baron-Cohen, & Bor; Focquaert, Steven, Wolford, Colden,
& Gazzaniga, 2007).
The differences in cognitive style assessed by the empathizing and systemizing quotient
are candidates for universal aspects of human cognition (Wakabayashi, Baron-Cohen,
Wheelwright, & Tojo, 2006). The sex differences between men and women, as well as the ability
to separate ASC from NT’s, has remained stable between Japan and Britain (Wakabayashi,
Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, & Tojo, 2006). Females typically score higher on tests and tasks
requiring empathizing, lower on tests and tasks requiring systemizing, whereas the inverse is true
for males and ASC individuals (Auyeung, Allison, Wheelwright, & Baron-Cohen, 2012;
Auyeung et al., 2009; Baron-Cohen et al., 2003).
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CHAPTER VI.
FOLK PSYCHOLOGY, THEORY OF MIND, AND VARIATION

The development of ToM into adult years and within a given cultural context has been
under studied and to the extent that (Apperly, 2013; Baron-Cohen, 1995; Gelman & Legare,
2011; Gopnik & Wellman, 1994; Heyes & Frith, 2014; Leslie, 2000; Vinden & Astington, 2000)
ToM is “colored-in,” shaped via natural pedagogy (Taves, 2015), and other environmental
factors through ontogenetic construction (Heyes, 2003) there should be cultural variation (H. C.
Barrett, 2012; Robbins, 2008; Whiten, 2013). Furthermore, depending on the extent to which the
linguistic practices within a given culture utilize mentalistic terms (belief-desire words) in their
vocabulary, this may influence an individual’s understanding of other minds (for review, see
Lillard, 1998; Vinden, 1999). The mind is understood by the formation of a folk psychological
theory.
Folk Psychology concerns how behavior is related to the mind. Using the belief-desire
concepts introduced by ToMM-SP (see Chap III.), the mind constructs “theories,” linking these
concepts to our experience (Morton, 2009). These theories have the potential to shape the way
events and situations are perceived and the appropriate behavior required in a specific context.
This chapter discusses variations in folk psychology, which may influence how we view other
minds and their relationship to the unseen—beliefs and supernatural agents.

Cultural Variations in Folk Psychology
Psychological–anthropological studies, focusing on “the way in which cultural content
‘interfaces’ with psychological processes” (D'Andrade, 1981, p. 182) constitute a promising
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avenue to explore cultural variations in how the mind is construed. Folk psychology, our
everyday understanding of reasons for actions and their relationship to the mind (Hutto, 2008;
Malle, 2004), provides the appropriate interface to explore how “the folk” conceptualize “the
mind.” For example, as an individual living in the European-American world, explaining unusual
behavior, such as if my thesis committee chair came to school with his head shaved bald, would
likely entail appealing to a breakdown in his own mental faculties (e.g., He’s gone crazy!).
Although alternatives could be offered, nothing else is needed to describe this occurrence. If this
situation occurred somewhere in Thailand or Indonesia, however, the explanation may be that
someone’s uncontrolled mental energy has entered my advisor’s brain and has caused him
remove all of the hair from his head (e.g., He’s been possessed!). And while both of these
explanations are related to ToM—in that they concern the socially acceptable constraints in
which behavior is interpreted in light of a particular conception of the mind—neither case may
be influencing some of the implicit, automatic processes recruited by ToM. These processes
allow the creation of folk psychologies. For example, just because a given culture has a folk
psychological theory denying the possibility of knowing what is in another’s mind does not mean
that they do not think about the minds of others (Lillard, 1998; Luhrmann, 2011b). At the
explicit level, ToM is ultimately a social enterprise, incorporating not just cognitive processes
but also explanations of behavior, contextual meaning, and utilized for social control and
management (H. C. Barrett, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2010; Byrne, 1996; Korman et al., 2015;
Kurzban & Athena Aktipis, 2007; Malle, 2004; Tomasello, 2014; Whiten & Erdal, 2012),
Understanding variations in the folk psychology of the mind contributes to an understanding of
ToM.
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Folk psychology represents an important level of description for the more basic processes
of ToM and for explanations in CSR (Taves, 2009). Luhrmann (2011a, p. 77) reviews the
anthropological literature on hallucinations and sensory overrides, connecting them to
supernatural belief and the functioning of the social brain continuum. Hearing voices or seeing
things that might not be there qualifies as a non-ordinary experience. No individual would deny
that people legitimately believe many non-ordinary experiences (or even ordinary) consist of
episodes where they are communicating with a supernatural agent. No researcher would deny
that ToM is involved when engaged in supernatural communication. However, the target or
“proper” domain of ToM is other humans—not gods—but our folk psychological framework, as
evidenced in the case of religion, spills over into the cultural or “actual” domain of this
mechanism. The framing of these non-ordinary experiences is under grid by an individual’s
biology (i.e., modular structure), it always involves a “cultural invitation” to a “specific theory”
(p. 77). This is congruent with the social control and management function of folk psychology
(Malle, 2004). Folk psychology opens humans up to what Galen (in prep) has characterized as
“libel phenomenology.” In sum, there is a difference between having an experience and the
description of that experience, whose characterization necessarily includes information gleaned
from others, some of which will be false. The phenomenology of perception is important, but
both of these descriptions/processes are inferential. Is that awe inspiring and interconnected
feeling you get walking in the woods “the work of God” or the equally beautiful byproduct of a
strictly materialist worldview? Did Joseph Smith’s “seer stones” really allow him to receive
direct revelations from God or was the founder of the Latter Day Saints simply a charismatic
man who had interesting conversations with rocks? Due to the functioning of humans evolved
coalitional psychology (Boyer, Firat, & van Leeuwen, 2015)—trust—everyday folk
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psychological discourse opens us up to misdirection regardless of how sincere the misdirector
may be (Sperber, 2010). Non-ordinary experiences can occur regardless of cultural background,
but these are in turn shaped by how individuals conceptualize the mind. Luhrmann (2011a,
2011b, 2012, 2013) emphasizes the role of learning in acquiring these capabilities. She notes that
while all folk theories of the mind are acquired socially, it is usually only in spiritual contexts
that one is urged foster the idea of a “porous mind.”

Folk Psychology and Language
One avenue for variation in folk psychology centers on language (Astington & Baird,
2005). Acquiring language, with its appropriately structured syntax, can not only scaffold the
implicit process involved in ToM (for review, see J. de Villiers, 2007; J. G. de Villiers & de
Villiers, 2014; Hale & Tager-Flusberg, 2003); see for a review), but also directly delimits the
range of given mental states terms (Lillard, 1998). Mental state terms are a human universal, all
languages and all cultures have at least some. The English language has over 2,000 words
denoting emotions, however the Chewong of Malaysia, in addition to possessing 5 terms for
mental processes (translated as want, want very much, forget, know, and miss or remember),
have roughly 23 terms for bodily states, traits, or emotions (Howell, 1981, 1984; Lillard, 1998).
As Lillard (1998, p. 13 italics in original) directs us: (Note that “think” is not even among them.)
The Junin Quechua of Peru, do not regularly appeal to or even have equivalent words for, the
English and Spanish equivalents of “think,” and instead use “say” in its place (Adelaar, 1977;
Vinden, 1996). In turn, this may limit the ability to pair mental states with corresponding actions,
thus resulting in a developmental variation in ToM and folk psychological explanations, as
mentalistic concepts are largely superfluous for the Quechua (Vinden, 1996). Another similar
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form of cultural variation in explicit ToM comes from Papua New Guinea. In many Melanesian
communities the ability to make inferences as to the mental contents of another is something
viewed with great skepticism, as the mind is strongly considered to be opaque (Robbins, 2008).
When minds are considered “unknowable,” motives may become less important (Lillard, 1998;
Ochs, 1988). For example, Lillard (1998, p. 13) points out that “Children in Samoa do not try to
get out of trouble by saying, ‘I did not do it on purpose,’ as they do in [European-American]
culture; instead they deny having done the deed at all.”

Folk Psychology and the Mind
Lillard (1998) suggests that most European Americans have a very dualistic notion of the
mind, first put forth by Descartes, which conceives of the mind as distinctly separate from the
body, yet located within it. The mind, however, is what people typically speak of when referring
to a notion of themselves (Johnson, 1990). Thus, to lose an arm in an industrial accident, for
example, is not to lose a part of “the self” only a part of one’s body. The European American
mind is also seen as a stable, unitary concept—after all, one typically says they have changed
their mind, not their prefrontal cortex (Lillard, 1998). In contrast, the Japanese emphasis on mind
is more fluid—it is integrated at various levels with the body. The Japanese term “kokoro,”
translated as “the embodied mind” (Lebra, 1993, p. 63), is affect laden, located in the heart and
includes links to genes and blood (Lebra, 1993; Lillard, 1998). Even the terms “hara, ki,” and
especially “seishin,” which denote more spiritual conceptualizations of the mind, are associated
with the body (Lebra, 1993). Naito and Koyama (2006, p. 299) found Japanese children tended
to emphasize behavioral or rule based explanations in false belief understanding, only “scarcely”
appealing to mental states. Not to syncretize or conflate Japanese and Chinese cultures, however,
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but Naito and Koyama’s (2006) finding is buffered by Doan and Wang’s (2010, p. 1498)
discovery that Chinese mothers emphasize “physical and behavioral manifestations of emotions”
in narrative interactions with their children in comparison to their American counterparts,
thereby temporarily emphasizing the body (behavior = body) over the mind. Despite these close
associations with the body, Japanese minds are thought of more as relational entities than fixed
structures, the mind(s) both are and are not a part of the body (Lebra, 1993). European
American’s may change their mind, but their Japanese counterparts could be changing their hara,
ki, kokoro, or seishin.
As discussed above, different folk psychological conceptualizations of the mind may
entail variations in attributions of and reasons for behavior. The most current and extensive
exploration of this variation is summarized in Luhrmann (2011b, p. 5) and colleagues’ collection
of “position papers” on the possibility of an “anthropological theory of mind.” That is, a ToM
that is rooted in universal psychological processes, yet pays mind to cultural variation. A brief
summary of these six positions will help elucidate the cultural variance of how individuals
conceive of the mind:
The Euro-American modern secular ToM treats the mind as having a clear boundary
between itself and objects in the external world. Thus, under this model of the mind, any notion
that a thought could be “inserted” or wander into another’s brain, is more likely to be treated as a
case of schizophrenia than a message from the planet Xenu. The modern secular ToM is the
proprietary, basic programming for the theories of mind that follow.
The Euro-American modern supernaturalist ToM (Luhrmann, 2011b), largely emulates
its secular brother. However, it treats the mind as something selectively permeable, allowing for
mental penetration for special classes of entities, such as gods, spirits, or “mental-like energy”
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involved in new age healing practices. Through training and practice, the supernaturalist ToM is
open to developing expertise in communicating with unseen agency.
The opacity of mind theory (Luhrmann, 2011b) conceives of the mind as inherently
unknowable to other individuals. Most often found throughout the South Pacific and Melanesia,
variants of the opaque mind privilege intentions that are expressed in explicit communication
over all else. It is considered bad manners to look in another’s eyes, as this might indicate one is
thinking about the unexpressed mental contents of the other. While allegedly impervious to other
humans, the opaque mind is nonetheless permeable by a special class of agents—spirits.
In the transparency of language theory, the best examples of which stem from Central
America (Luhrmann, 2011b), language is (should be) a reflection of entities and relationship that
hold in the world—not internal mental states. In some cases, fiction and pretense by children is
discouraged. Mental state vocabulary words are few, as what matters most is the relationship
between an utterance and facts in the world, not correspondence to an inner mental state.
Under the mind control theory, the best example being found in Thailand but also in other
parts of Asia, discipline of the mind is emphasized (Luhrmann, 2011b). Minds can exhibit
greater or lesser degrees of “control.” In a poorly controlled mind, one where emotions and
thoughts may be overbearing, these mental states can infect other unbalanced minds and vice
versa. This theory of mind differs noticeably from the secular mind, as “mind stuff” is able to
enter the minds of others, still partially bearing the original thinkers mental state.
The final theory of mind Luhrmann (Luhrmann, 2011b) has identified, perspectivism,
typical of some Amazonian peoples, suggests that minds can travel from one body to the next.
Individuals may believe that they can take up the mental faculties of, say, a jaguar. Likewise, a
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jaguar could contain a human mind and individuals have claimed to see just such instances.
There is also the fear that one could end up permanently in some non-human form.
Two themes emerge amongst these different cultural theories of mind; the distinction
between a porous and a bounded mind (Luhrmann, 2011b, 2012). While no cognitive scientist
would deny cultural variation of ToM, the extent to which a particular cultural expression has the
ability to affect implicit, lower level, processing and representation of mental states is a key point
of contention (Astuti & Bloch, 2012; Danziger, 2009). Thus, while different cultural theories of
mind may enable an individual to believe their thoughts can inhabit and control the body of
another individual (Cassaniti & Luhrmann, 2011) or that they are engaged in a conversation with
the Christian god (Luhrmann, 2012; Luhrmann & Morgain, 2012), or that the secular mind is
bounded—existing only in the head (Luhrmann, 2011b)—these are cultural expressions, the
“theories” of an underlying cognitive architecture (Sperber & Hirschfeld, 1999, p. cxxvi).
It is easy to see how the different folk theories of the mind characterized by Luhrmann
(2011b) underlie, and indeed are, much of what we think of when conceptualizing religion. But,
“religion” is hard to define outside of its Christian history and its status as a useful category must
be proved and not assumed. Drawing on attribution theory, Taves (2009) has recently introduced
the expression “things deemed religious or special” in order to create a tractable category for
scientific inquiry, connecting first-hand accounts of folk psychological experience to the
cognitive mechanisms that generated them. The next chapter reviews these mechanisms.
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CHAPTER. VII
THEORY OF MIND AND COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF RELIGION

Why does human belief in some sort of supernatural agency appear, stretching far back
into deep history, and, currently, across oceans and continents? If a family member or friend
suffered from blindness, why, in order to return their vision, might someone choose to perform a
ritual that has no actual causal connection to any possibility of reversing blindness, such as
prayer (pace Jesus Christ himself; John: 9, King James Version), or concoct a potion of rust,
dehydrated pig’s eye, and wild honey to inject into their loved one’s ear to rectify this malady
(Legare & Souza, 2012)? Why do humans believe that there is a soul and that this immaterial
“self” may venture into the afterlife upon death? These types of questions, along with many
others commonly regarded as comprising “religion,” can be addressed by the cognitive science
of religion.
Rather than constantly engaging in debates over what religion “really is,” the strategy of
fracturing religion into individual components, such as anthropomorphism (Guthrie, 1995),
teleology (Kelemen, 2004), theory of mind (Boyer, 2001) etc., has been met with great success in
CSR. The different theories of ToM used in CSR, or terms rather, all capture phenomena that can
be categorized as either secular or religious. Take, for example, ritual drumming (or other
musical engagement), which is a common component of religious gatherings. What separates a
religious ritual from a nonreligious ritual? Is there something inherently special about banging on
a container to produce a sound that makes this act particularly “religious?” Although religion and
religious rituals do hold great personal meaning and special status to many individuals, there is
nothing particularly special about them. McCauley and Lawson (2002, p. 10) exemplify the
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relationship between a religious ritual and a nonreligious ritual by drawing attention to the
particular action(s) and not the aura of cultural meaning the act is embedded in: “Ritual
drummers ritually beating drums are still drummers beating drums.” The categories of religion
and the secular are modern inventions of the nation state; they are co-constructive and depend on
one another to gain their own meaning (Jong, 2015; McCutcheon, 2007). There is nothing
special about religion (Bloch, 2008), it is a folk concept, a family resemblance category
(Bulbulia, 2005).
Nonetheless, CSR does find that there are still something’s that deserving of the label
“religion.” Following McCauley (2011), I distinguish popular or folk religion from theological
reflection. An example of popular religion would be the widespread belief in the evil eye; the
idea that a curse or hex can be given to an individual through a malignant glare. This kind of folk
belief—sending or receiving causally opaque mental energy—goes hand in hand with the idea of
a “porous theory of mind.”
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Figure 9 Examples of the “evil eye” talisman: from a market (upper left) by FocalPoint / CC BYSA 3.0; “mal de ojo” from El Salvador (middle left); Roman-era mosaic depicting evil
eye (bottom left) United States Public Domain; A quote from the 13th century Islamic
scholar Jalāl ad-Dīn Muhammad Rūmī combined with a talisman (right)

From West Asia to the Americas and stretching back into antiquity, people have created or
purchased amulets and other artifacts to protect both themselves and their children from its
malevolent powers. But this kind of religion exists and pervades through theological reflection as
evident by the fact that believers in the evil eye are not just “pagan folk,” although many may be,
they are Muslims, Christians, Jews, etc.—much to the chagrin of the theological reflection
espoused by these ecclesial authorities. Still, “if humans were naïve realists there would be no
religion” (Lieberoth, 2013, p. 169). And indeed, many times these folk beliefs are
commandeered by theology and even absorbed into a particular religious’ tradition (Xygalatas,
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Forthcoming). Shops selling “religious” artifacts side by side with various magical powders,
potions, or other items can be found throughout the Americas (Chesnut, 2012). The natural roots
of “religion” lay in cognitive mechanisms with a deep evolutionary history and do not
necessarily align with their theological counterparts, although their cultural expression is
continually elaborated on.
Religion is not a sui generis phenomenon (Coleman & Hood, 2015; McCutcheon, 2007;
Taves, 2009), it requires no unique or special postulates in order to be explained by science—
according to McCauley (2011, p. 155) “the sundry psychological dispositions that develop in
human minds” are all that is needed (also see Lawson, 2000). Thus, no matter what the
mechanism is called that mediates social interaction with gods and other spirits, this will be a
mechanism that operates in a number of domains having absolutely nothing at all to do with
religion. CSR is methodologically pluralistic, encompassing a variety of disciplines from
religious studies, anthropology, and primarily, cognitive science. Religious ideas are natural
byproducts of ordinary cognitive faculties and this makes them appealing, and easy to transmit
(J. L. Barrett, 2011, 2012; Bering, 2006; Bloom, 2007; Boyer, 2001, 2003, 2010; McCauley,
2011; Taves, 2015; Xygalatas, 2014). Despite the appearance of widespread surface variation in
religious beliefs there are remarkable convergences across people, places, and time. As
McCauley (2011, p. 152) puts it:
A small number of variations on a limited set of elements lies beneath the assorted
myths, rituals, beliefs, doctrines, icons, sacred spaces, and more that humanity’s
religions present. Our maturationally natural cognitive systems are primarily
responsible for those elements and the forms that their variations take.
It is no coincidence, then, that religious representations often involve a violation of the kinds of
features the ToM system has been “designed” to expect (e.g., That two solid objects can’t pass
through each other) (see Chapter III.).
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Religious ideas are about belief in supernatural agents (Beit-Hallahmi, 2015; Franek,
2014). Theologians (Plantinga, 2011) and other religiously inclined appear to premise this much
(e.g., J. W. Jones, 2016). Despite “religion” being a problematic and deeply contested category,
reflecting euro-protestant ethnocentrism (Cotter & Robertson, 2016), supernatural agents do
differ from ordinary agents (e.g., humans) by possessing non-ordinary powers (Taves, 2015),
violating our intuitive assumptions about culturally available schemas (Purzycki & Willard,
2015) and reoccurring core domains of knowledge (Boyer, 2001, 2003). This characterization
may not capture the precise qualities possessed by each and every “religious representation,”
pace J. W. Jones (2016), but one has to start somewhere and at some level of generalization.

Table 3 Counter-intuitive agent concepts (Adapted from Boyer, 2003, p. 119)
Person + counter-intuitive physics

“Ghost entered room through the wall!!!”

Person + counter-intuitive biology

“Spirits never die!!!”

Person + counter-intuitive psychology

“This statue will listen to your prayers!!!”

For example, despite the fact that trees lack ears and a brain, the Uduk-speaking people of Sudan
believe that ebony trees hold strategic knowledge and can listen in on their conversations (Boyer,
2001). In the monotheistic traditions quasi-incorporeal beings such as angels are not only thought
to communicate socially with individuals, but they can pass right through your bedroom wall on
their way to perform a miraculous feat. For many individuals, interacting with these incorporeal
beings is a daily occurrence (Luhrmann, 2012). Studies suggest that thinking about these
supernatural agents activates the same areas of the brain utilized in normal, everyday, social
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cognition, when thinking about ordinary agents (Epley, Converse, Delbosc, Monteleone, &
Cacioppo, 2009; Gray, Jenkins, Heberlein, & Wegner, 2011; Kapogiannis et al., 2009;
Kapogiannis, Deshpande, Krueger, Thornburg, & Grafman, 2014; Schjoedt, StødkildeJørgensen, Geertz, & Roepstorff, 2009). ToM is a core system supporting religious thought.

The Meta-Representational Mind and Supernatural Belief
Meta-representations, to recall its earlier discussion in the manuscript, is a
representational, cognitive copy, of some other primary representation (e.g., the difference
between seeing a particular tobacco pipe and thinking about a tobacco pipe). Along with others
(Bloch, 2008; Boyer & Bergstrom, 2008; Gervais, 2013b; Lane & Harris, 2014; McCauley,
2011; Norenzayan & Gervais, 2013), J. L. Barrett (2011, 2012) suggests the relationship between
ToM and religious belief rests not on any single cognitive system per se, but in the capacity to
have a meta-representational ToM (or something like it), instead. On his account, ToM of the
highest order is the adaptation that makes religious belief possible. “The concurrence
hypothesis,” which J. L. Barrett (2011, p. 212) puts forth, argues that whatever capacities exist
that makes humans, human, also makes religion distinctively human. In order to have a
relationship with an unseen god, just like having a relationship to the mind of another, one must
be able to represent and reflect on the content of other’s thoughts. According to J.L. Barrett,
meta-representational ToM covers several domains, from enabling cooperation and trust, to
facilitating the transmission of cumulative culture. This is why archaeologists often emphasize
the role this ability has played (much as it continues today) in socio-political control and
dominance (Gamble, 2013; Lewis-Williams, 2002), which evolved hand-in-hand with religion.
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Like Bering’s account below, J. L. Barrett finds other animals lack the symbolic capacities
required for religious belief.
Meta-representational Research
The human social cognitive system, effortlessly and intuitively, generates and responds to
religious ideas, such as belief in supernatural agents in neurotypical individuals. Perceiving these
non-ordinary agents is surprisingly quite similar to perceiving other minds or believing in other
unseen entities, germs for example (Gervais, 2013b; Lane & Harris, 2014). In the domain of
religion, meta-representational ToM has been primarily explored through variations of false
belief tasks in young children. Around the age of four, with the development of a full metarepresentational theory of mind, children are able to make a variety of mental state and
knowledge distinctions with this ability. Children’s reasoning about God beliefs often matches
the implicit responses in adults (for reviews, see Heiphetz, Lane, Waytz, & Young, 2016; Lane
& Harris, 2014), who represent God as being limited by the same anthropomorphic constraints as
average humans (J. L. Barrett & Keil, 1996). For example, children believe that God is more
likely to know another’s desires than their own parents, however they treat God with the same
human limitations as their parents—being able to hear some things yet not others (Canfield &
Ganea, 2014). But, in addition to parsing what God or their parents might know (Knight, Sousa,
Barrett, & Atran, 2004), young children also have a tendency to parse and attribute knowledge to
animals (Richert & Barrett, 2005) and imaginary friends (Wigger, Paxson, & Ryan, 2013). In
sum, the development of supernatural agent concepts closely mirrors each stage of development
in children’s’ mentalizing abilities (c.f., Lane & Harris, 2014; Norenzayan & Gervais, 2013).
Adept at applying their meta-representational ToM, around the age of seven years old,
children can perceive intentionally communicated messages in otherwise random events (Bering
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& Parker, 2006). Nonetheless, children at this age still do not seem to appreciate that two mental
states can conflict and affect behavior (Choe, Keil, & Bloom, 2005), thus they may not be able to
appreciate that belief in super natural agency is counter to a naturalistic worldview. Both
religious and nonreligious adults, however, also carry-on this tendency to endow certain classes
of life events with purposeful, intentional, meaning.

Existential Theory of Mind
Bering (2002, 2006, 2011) conceptualizes the EToM as a derived, domain general,
evolutionary adaptation of human cognition. The EToM is a uniquely human trait, according to
Bering (2002), having a phylogenetic history that places the precursors for the evolution of this
capacity within the divergence of hominins from Pan troglodytes. However, he suggests that
EToM as a fully functioning system shows its appearance with the arrival of full symbolic
capacity in Homo sapiens, arguably occurring between “30,000 and 60,000 years ago” (Bering,
2002, p. 9). If religion goes hand in hand with the development of the EToM, then, on Bering’s
account, religion—or anything worthy of the label—did not exist before the transition to to
behaviorally modern humans.6
EToM is an extension of the typical processes of ToM, however rather than functioning
to predict mental states and actions, it is specified to attribute personal meaning to certain kinds
of autobiographical experiences (e.g., What was the meaning of this particular event for me?).
Like other theories of ToM, EToM processes meta-representations—the opaque, copy of a copy
of a primary representation. However, EToM is focused on existential meaning, in abstract,

6

The notion that there has been some axial point in which anatomically modern humans magically became
behaviorally modern is highly contested within the archaeological literature (c.f., Gamble, 2013; Lewis-Williams,
2002; Nowell, 2010).

78

causally opaque situations (Bering, 2003). For example, a recent study with Latino mothers’ of
autistic children found that, despite having some who attributed this occurrence to purely
biological factors, many mothers saw their children’s condition as an intentional “message from
God” (Salkas, Magaña, Marques, & Mirza, 2016). However, it is not just in challenging life
situations when chance happenings can combine to be perceived as part of some greater
meaning. For another example, think of the happenstance situation of the flighty bachelor
running into an old crush from high school at a supermarket 30 years later, only to end up
settling down and getting married. What were the chances that these two should meet at this
particular moment in time and after all these years? While there is most certainly a complex
causal explanation to be had, at some level, this will not be the “go-to” folk intuition. Rather, this
fortuitous rendezvous is more likely to be seen as the hand of God shepherding his children
together once more (e.g., Salkas et al., 2016), or the powers of the universe combing just so these
two old lovers could reignite the flame. These explanations are pregnant with intentional
meaning that a strictly physical universe, according to Bering, could never account for.
The few studies that have aimed to capture aspects of EToM—that individuals have a
tendency to imbue life events in general and some important events in specific, with a telos—
have yielded promising results. Primarily utilizing self-report or open-ended questions, asking
individuals to report on their level of belief in teleological concepts, such as agentive or nonagentive “fate” (Banerjee & Bloom, 2014) and “life’s purpose” (Willard & Norenzayan, 2013),
these studies have suggested that supernatural belief (and even belief in the paranormal) are
correlated with these tendencies. Only Banerjee and Bloom’s (2014, p. 277) study explicitly
included atheists in their sample, finding a small percentage who tended to perceive design and
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purpose in life events, concluding that this teleological perception does not belong to
supernatural thinking alone, residing instead in “more general social propensities.”
Heywood and Bering (2014), who also included atheists in their study, utilized semistructured interviews to probe for teleological answers in response to questions about
autobiographical events. The authors measured explicit religious identification, postulating that,
despite the atheist stance (as they operationalized it) ruling out any type of higher purpose,
atheists would nonetheless generate intuitive responses that were incompatible with their explicit
worldview. And while theists generated the highest number of teleological narratives, atheists
did make some attributions of a higher purpose in their responses. Similar to Banerjee and
Bloom (2014), Heywood and Bering (2014) conclude that the EToM is an ability shared, to
varying degrees, regardless of religious identification.

Teleology
Alongside the meta-representational ToM, children develop an overactive sense of
teleology. As discussed in chapter X, this teleological impulse—finding people and occasionally
objects, appear to “act” on the basis of purposeful intentions—is a core component of ToM.
Children as young as 2 and 3 years old show a preference for purposeful explanations, finding
explanations such as “rocks are pointy so you don’t sit on them” more appealing than physical
causal explanations, “rocks are pointy because stuff builds up over time” (Casler & Kelemen,
2007; Kelemen, 1999a, 1999b, 2003, 2004). Although less pronounced, these teleological
tendencies continue into adulthood (Kelemen & Rosset, 2009), appear to be further attenuated by
cultural input such as education (Casler & Kelemen, 2007), however are still present even in
physical scientists (Kelemen et al., 2013). Teleological reasoning even bleeds into the minds of
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nonbelievers (Järnefelt, Canfield, & Kelemen, 2015), however appears to be strongest in
individuals who already hold religious beliefs (Banerjee & Bloom, 2014) and are raised within a
religious environment (Rottman et al., 2016). This data indicates that while the teleological bias
is pervasive, it is also widely susceptible to cultural influence and rooted in more general sociocognitive tendencies rather than the narrower domain of the religious impulse.

Dualism
Similar to teleology, dualism, the perspective that separates mind (or the “soul”) as an
intentional entity apart from matter, an intentionless object, is another early developing crosscultural intuition that underlies religious beliefs (Bloom, 2007). For example, when I lecture on
the topic of ToM, I show people a picture of a brain and ask them, “what is this a picture of”? Of
course they respond, “it’s a brain!” However, even in a room full of atheists’ no one ever shouts
out, “it’s a mind!” This is because the notion that the mind is not the brain is intuitive, perhaps
leading even some philosophers and cognitive scientists (e.g., Chalmers, 1995, 2007; Searle,
1980, 2013) to embrace a kind of Cartesian dualism. Nuances in this debate abound (c.f., Lowe,
2011), but the eliminative materialist position—that the existence of the folk mental states
processed by the mind, such as beliefs and desires, constitute a radically false scientific account
of the mind—appears to be the most scientifically tractable and productive account of the mind
(Churchland, 1981, 1989, 1993, 2007). Nonetheless, that mind is separate from the body may be
a libel intuition that further enriches supernatural beliefs.
The development of dualistic intuitions (i.e., intuitive dualism) also appears crossculturally (Astuti & Harris, 2008; Huang, Cheng, & Zhu, 2013). For example, both children and
adults attribute desire, emotional, and other epistemic mental states (e.g., thinking about one’s
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spouse or knowing they may be angry) to the recently deceased as ghosts and spirits (Bering,
2002; Bering & Bjorklund, 2004; Huang et al., 2013). And, most often it is these mental states
and not psychobiological or perceptual states (e.g., feeling hungry or seeing something) that are
attributed to the dearly departed (Bering, 2002; Bering, Blasi, & Bjorklund, 2005; Huang et al.,
2013; Lindeman, Riekki, & Svedholm-Häkkinen, 2015). Shtulman (2008) has demonstrated that
adults attribute psychological properties to religious agents, over and above physical or
biological properties, however children appear to weigh these aspects equally (also see Shtulman
& Lindeman, 2016).
In some contrast to intuitive dualism, reflective dualism is the explicit stance that mind
and matter are not the same. Again, think about philosopher David Chalmers (2007). Chalmers
has certainly pondered his place in the universe and with philosophical training, has defended the
idea that consciousness is irreducible to the physical. This is reflective dualism. Research has
suggested that confusing “core” knowledge (c.f., Spelke, 2000)—for example, mixing agentive
properties with physical properties, such as “Stars live in the sky.”—is at the root of not only
reflective dualism, but also supernatural and paranormal beliefs (Lindeman, Riekki, et al., 2015;
Lindeman, Svedholm-Häkkinen, et al., 2015; Riekki, Lindeman, & Lipsanen, 2013).
Importantly, humans are not determined to be unapologetic dualists and individual
differences have been identified. For example, Lindeman, Riekki, and Svedholm-Hakkinen’s
(2015) study found at least a small group of “monists” who attribute mental, psychobiological,
and biological functions only to the brain. And, on the opposite end, the researchers discovered a
large group of “spiritualists” who attribute these functions not only the brain, but also the mind
and soul. Although some theoretical debate remains as to whether or not humans are truly
cognitively capable of being dualists, due to the contributions of offline social cognition to
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represent agents as embodied (Hodge, 2008, 2011) at the level of the “folk,” research indicates
that people generally believe that the mind is not the body in life, and even can continue after
death (also see Lane & Harris, 2014).

Mentalizing
Mentalizing involves thinking about and attributing mental states to other agents. These
agents can be human (e.g., I wonder what Ralph does in his free time?), supernatural (e.g., If I
lose my religion, Allah will be very angry.), or ambiguous (e.g., Hearing a tree limb snap in the
night and wondering, “who’s there?”). Mentalizing combines some of the core components of
ToM, mental state attribution.
Overwhelmingly, women are more likely to be religious than men, as well as have
superior mentalizing capabilities (Beit-Hallahmi, 2015). Both of these relationships are
consistently found in the literature (e.g., Norenzayan et al., 2012; Rosenkranz & Charlton, 2013).
In the “earliest” attempt to explore the relationship between mentalizing and supernatural belief,
across three studies, Norenzayan et al. (2012) found mentalizing to mediate belief in a personal
God, however each study only had a marginal number of atheists (13.7%, 11.6%, 4%).
Furthermore, their analyses only compared high and low belief, and found only weak
relationships to mentalizing. Thus both groups were, methodologically speaking, all theists as
there was no grouping for atheism or “no belief”. Nonetheless, systemizing alone predicted
lower god beliefs.
In a single study, Rosenkranz and Charlton (2013) found mentalizing predicts “religious
orientation” and systemizing predicts “science acceptance.” And, while there were atheists and
theists in their sample, it might be assumed that theists were the latter and atheists the former,
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however the researchers never measured directly compared atheists and theists, only an
individual’s level of religious orientation or science acceptance.
Both dualism and to a lesser degree teleological reasoning, have been shown to mediate
the relationship between mentalizing and supernatural belief (Willard & Norenzayan, 2013).
According to Willard and Norenzayan’s (2013, p. 388) study, which tested for individual
differences in mentalizing, anthropomorphism, and dualism, found that the relationship between
these cognitive biases was directional, leading to religious and paranormal belief, and belief in
life’s purpose, “and not the other way around.” However, all the SEM path relationships in
Willard and Norenzayan’s study going from mentalizing to these cognitive biases were “either
weak or non-significant” (Lindeman, Svedholm-Häkkinen, et al., 2015, p. 64). In a similar study,
Banerjee and Bloom (2014) found that while mentalizing predicted teleological reasoning about
one’s own life, belief in fate, and finding meaning hidden in life events, it failed to predict the
attribution of life events to God or tendencies for to apply teleology more generally. Lindeman et
al. (2015) also found a weak relationship from mentalizing ability (and promiscuous teleology)
to predict supernatural belief, testing this against several other biases, of which, confusing core
ontological knowledge (e.g., assigning “mental” properties to physical objects) was the single
best predictor of belief in supernatural purpose. While the researchers did not allow participants
to report if they were atheist, over 50% of their Finnish sample identified as “non-religious.”
Having similar methodological limits to other studies I have mentioned, one should not confuse a
survey identification of “no religion” with having no god beliefs (Lee, 2014). Interestingly, their
analysis did reveal that individuals with strong mentalizing skills, but with poor understandings
of physical causality and low systemizing skills professed more supernatural belief than all other
groups. This is what we would expect given the role of the social brain in human evolution—
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overly mentalistic individuals with poor causal reasoning abilities will hold fairly high levels of
supernatural beliefs. Nonetheless, other recent studies have continued to find weak relationships
with mentalizing and supernatural belief (e.g., Reddish et al., 2016; Wlodarski & Pearce, 2016).

High Functioning Autism, Theory of Mind, and Religious Belief
Few studies exist examining variation in ToM alongside religiosity, in individuals with
HFA spectrum disorders. In one of the first studies, Caldwell-Harris et al., (2011) found that
HFA individuals were more likely to be atheist or agnostic and if they did identify as “religious,”
they constructed their own religious belief system. In addition, she also found atheists to have
significantly higher systemizing scores and did not uncover any differences in mentalizing.
Reddish, Tok, and Kundt (2016) found several significant differences between mentalizing in
ASC and NT’s in how anthropomorphic they viewed God, or felt closeness to Him, however all
had small effect sizes. As suggested by others (Bering, 2002, 2011), the image of God possessed
by ASC individuals may be different from NT’s. For example, Schaap-Jonker, Sizoo, Roekel,
and Corveleyn (2013) found that the God image of individuals diagnosed with ASC had more
negative traits and fewer positive traits than their NT group.
Qualitative approaches, focusing on individual manifestations of religiosity and
spirituality in ASC individuals, are rare. However, one study, conducted by Visuri (2012),
utilized semi-structured interviews to probe for the relationship between BAP traits and religious
views in four persons on the ASC. Given the wide net cast by EToM over existential questions
(Coleman & Hood, 2015), Visuri (2012, p. 373) uncovered that her participants possess some
form of existential ponderance, but “they do not tell of coming to any conclusions,” she writes.
Rather than thorough impairments in mentalizing abilities, the curiosity and reflexivity of the
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participants may have triggered not disbelief, but instead, a deeper existential mystery. Noting
this, Visuri (2012) concludes that regardless of the possible differences in mentalizing and EToM
displayed by ASC individuals, there are substantial cultural influences, which will need to be
further taken into account in much needed future research.
Using the cognitive styles framework—empathizing/mentalizing and
systemizing/analytic thinking—Lindeman and Lipsanen (2016) recently uncovered 5 subgroups
each of atheists and theists who differed on aspects of cognitive style. Additionally, Norenzayan
and Gervais (2013) have suggested four paths to nonbelief, two of which concerns mentalizing
and analytic thinking. This research suggests that any totalizing attempts to conceptualize a
binary of cognitive traits characterizing either religious believers or nonbelievers is problematic.
This data supports an account of belief and nonbelief following an individual differences
approach to religiosity (Beit-Hallahmi, 2015; Caldwell-Harris, 2012; Reddish et al., 2016;
Wlodarski & Pearce, 2016).
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CHAPTER VIII.
DIVERSITY OF NONBELIEF

The scientific study of nonreligion is still in its infancy, particularly from a psychological
perspective (Coleman, Hood, & Shook, 2015). The number of atheists measures over half a
billion worldwide (Norenzayan & Gervais, 2013). Secular and atheistic individuals can even be
found in predominantly Muslim countries such as Turkey (Sevinc, Coleman, & Hood, In Press;
Sevinc, Hood, & Coleman, In Press). The vast majority of atheists are deconverts (Fazzino,
2014; Streib & Klein, 2013). There are “hidden” atheists in the Christian pulpit (Dennett &
LaScola, 2010) and surrounding the Jewish Ark (Shrell-Fox, 2015)—there are certain to be
more. Atheists and the nonreligious comprise some of the fastest growing “religious”
demographics (Twenge, Exline, Grubbs, Sastry, & Campbell, 2015) and are projected to
maintain this growth (Stinespring & Cragun, 2015). Despite these positive projections of growth,
perceptions of atheists are negative.
Widespread stigmatization and prejudice of atheists exists within the public sphere
(Cragun, Kosmin, Keysar, Hammer, & Nielsen, 2012; Edgell, Gerteis, & Hartmann, 2006;
Mann, 2015). For example, many state constitutions in the United States officially forbid atheists
from holding public office, however these laws are no longer enforceable. Research suggest that
discrimination against atheists is primarily based upon a perceived lack of “moral trust”
(Gervais, 2013a) and that even exposing individuals to information suggesting our moral sense is
innate does not reduce this view (Mudd, Naijle, Ng, & Gervais, 2015). Nonetheless, atheists
appear to lead lives as normal and moral as any other religious group (Coleman & Arrowood,
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2015; Zuckerman, 2014). However, comparatively little research has been conducted with
atheists compared to the religious.
Over the past century, hundreds of scales have been developed measuring different
“facets,” “orientations,” or “dimensions” of religiosity (Hill & Hood, 1999). Measurement scales
appropriate for a secular or nonbelieving person are virtually nonexistent, however recent years
have seen some developments (e.g., Bradley, 2014; Cragun, Hammer, & Nielsen, 2015; Schnell,
2015). However, initial survey and experimental research does exist for atheist samples,
measuring atheism as a nominal variable. This research highlights personality and cognitive
variation among nonbelievers, as well as their convergence and contrast to religious believers.
There is now some evidence that compared to theists, atheists and the nonreligious are
more open to experience, less dogmatic, favor analytic thinking styles over intuitions
(Pennycook, Ross, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2016), and have specific interests in the sciences
(Caldwell-Harris, 2012; Farias, 2013). Among themselves, atheists also demonstrate differences
in personality variables. For example, despite individuals overwhelmingly viewing atheists as
“angry,” this relationship varying as a function of religiosity (Meier, Fetterman, Robinson, &
Lappas, 2015), research suggests only a small portion of atheists (less than 15%) may have
higher trait anger (Silver, Coleman, Hood, & Holcombe, 2014). Using an individual difference in
personality variables approach, Silver, Coleman, Hood, and Holcombe (2014) have uncovered at
least 6 “Types” of nonbelief, and variation in psychological type has been reported elsewhere
(Baker & Robbins, 2012; Gibson, 2006). There is a strong intellectual component to atheism
(Caldwell-Harris, Wilson, LoTempio, & Beit-Hallahmi, 2011) and nonbelievers can demonstrate
cognitive styles that vary on levels of empathizing, mechanistic (systemizing) cognition, autism
quotient traits, and analytic thinking (Lindeman & Lipsanen, 2016). This is because the same

88

processes supporting belief also support nonbelief (Banerjee & Bloom, 2013; Coleman et al.,
2015; Geertz, 2010, 2013). Despite this, paths to atheism have been conceptualized from a deficit
point of view, finding atheists must be lacking normally functioning brains in explanation for
their lack of belief.

Atheism and Theory of Mind
Is not believing in any gods is similar to having a physical disability? While one might
first laugh at such a provocative statement, perhaps rub their eyes in disbelief, J. L. Barrett
(2012, p. 203) has suggested precisely this: “Not believing in any sort of gods may prove to be a
trait that is analogous to not being able to walk.” One of the most important theoretical
assumptions within CSR literature is that variations in ToM or mentalizing abilities can explain
diminished or absent god beliefs (i.e. explain nonbelief). In short, it has been suggested that
atheists may not believe in God because they are “socially disabled” (J. L. Barrett, 2012, p. 85),
“mind-blind” (Norenzayan & Gervais, 2013)7, or have a “malfunction” in their mind-reading
abilities (Clark & Visuri, In press) that is characterized by mentalizing deficits associated with
the autism spectrum (Norenzayan & Gervais, 2013). Using the term “male-brained” as a stand-in
for mentalizing deficits, J. L. Barrett (2012, p. 205) further summarizes this view by suggesting
that:
If theory of mind and related social cognition are so critical for theistic belief
and if severe male-brained people are weak in or lack these social cognitive
abilities, then we would predict that people who have always found it difficult
or impossible to believe in any gods might tend to be more male-brained.

In order to better characterize this suggestion, Norenzayan and Gervais (2013) note that “mind blindness” is only
one possible cognitive route to nonbelief. However, the other routes they cover are typically out of favor with CSR
standard accounts, and of no relevance to the current thesis.
7
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The theoretical centrality of ToM in explanations of religious (non)belief should not
outweigh its empirical signature. Do atheists really lack a properly functioning ToM when
compared to theists and to what extent do males and females vary in ToM functioning and
supernatural belief? Based on a review of the literature the following hypotheses are tested:
Hypothesis 1: Atheists will score lower than theists on the Mentalistic ToM components of
intentionality and mental state attribution.
Hypothesis 2: Atheists will score higher than theists on the selection processor component of
ToM.
Hypothesis 3: Atheists will display more BAP traits than theists.
Hypothesis 4: Sex differences are predicted in both atheist and theist groups on all measures,
with females scoring higher than males on mentalistic aspects of ToM and social components of
the BAP.
Hypothesis 5: ASC (self)diagnoses will be more prevalent among atheists compared to theists.
Hypothesis 6: Atheists with ASC (self)diagnoses will differ significantly from non-ASC atheists
on all measures.

90

CHAPTER IX.
METHODS

Baron-Cohen (1995) and Leslie’s (1994b) characterization of a theory of mind module
are combined and specific components of this device are related back to the following measures:
Rosset (2008) intentionality bias scale [ID/ToBy/ToMM1]; Baron-Cohen et al. (2001) Reading
the mind in the eyes [ToMM2/ SAM], and the cognitive reflector test (CRT) (Frederick, 2005)
[SP].

Participants and Procedure
This study received institutional review board approval (exemption, protocol # 3010X)
from Boston University (BU) and was conducted under the supervision of the principal
investigator, Dr. Catherine Caldwell-Harris in collaboration with myself, Thomas Coleman. The
study also received institutional review board approval at the University of Tennessee at
Chattanooga (# 16-068), specifically requesting to use this (now) archival data. The data was
collected through the BU Qualtrics online survey software. Participants were recruited from the
BU undergraduate psychology majors research pool and by responding to an online posting
published by The Friendly Atheist blog (http://www.patheos.com/blogs/friendlyatheist/) at the
request of Thomas Coleman. This online posting invited “atheists, theists, and anyone who might
consider themselves ‘in-between” to respond to an online survey about how personality and
cognitive styles might influence belief and attributions of intentionality. While it is possible to
raise some questions regarding the psychological typicality for any theists recruited from a
predominantly atheist blog (e.g., Did you have theists that were bordering considering, or close
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to, atheism in your sample?), this interpretation is unlikely. For example, religious individuals do
subscribe to The Friendly Atheist and this blog is hosted as part of a much larger website
(Patheos.com), which primarily contains popular theist blogs. In addition, the individuals in the
theist group all selected statements affirming the existence of God (see, Dawkins theism scale
below).
Compared to theists (N = 103), atheists were intentionally oversampled (N = 2423), in
order to detect subtle individual differences in traits associated with ASC and specific ToM
components. The survey was completed in the following order: A brief demographics section,
the CRT, a measure of religiosity, the Rosset (items were randomized), the BAPQ, the RMTE
(items were randomized), religion questions and Dawkins theism scale. In addition to the scales
analyzed in the current study, the survey contained a dimensional measure of religiosity and
several demographics questions, which are outside of the scope of this thesis and have been
omitted. All data was analyzed using the SPSS-23 statistical package.
This sample analyzed consisted of a total N = 2526 fully completed participant responses.
The mean age represented in the data set was 39.05 years and 59.6% of the sample identified as
male. Atheists were intentionally oversampled (N = 2423), in order to detect subtle individual
differences in traits associated with ASC and specific ToM components in comparison theists (N
= 103). The atheist group was predominately male (59.6%) and the theist group was
predominately female (59.2%).

Materials
ASC conditions question. The survey invited participants to check one or more of the
following categories if they had: Clinician diagnosed Asperger’s, self-diagnosed, “not sure if I
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have it or not,” Autism, Pervasive Developmental Disorder, Sensory Integration, and “other.”
Only the Autism and Asperger’s categories will be utilized in the analyses.
Broader Autism Phenotype Questionnaire (BAPQ). The BAPQ is a quantitative measure
of 3 domain traits as described by Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV (2000).
The subscales for each domain are: aloof personality (e.g., I enjoy being in social situations.),
rigid personality (e.g., I am comfortable with unexpected changes in plans [reverse scored].), and
pragmatic language problems (e.g., I find it hard to get my words out smoothly.). All subscales
invite participants to respond on a six point Likert scale (1, Vary rarely—Very often, 6) how
much each statement applies to themselves. Although other scales measuring the BAP have been
utilized in research on religion (e.g., the autism quotient), when these scale are compared with
each other the BAPQ out performs all the rest (Ingersoll et al., 2011).
Rosset Intentionality Scale (RIS). The RIS measures one’s tendency towards an
“intentionality bias” (Rosset, 2008) and will serve as a measure of the intentionality component
of ToM. It asks participants to infer actions as either “on purpose” or “on accident” in 40
situations (10 per factor) that are unambiguously intentional (“He buttoned his jacket.”),
unambiguously accidental (“He poked himself in the eye.”), prototypically accidental (“He hit
the man with his car”), and neutral/prototypically intentional (“She cut him off driving.”). This
will be (has been) given to participants without any emphasis on speed, so they are free to take as
little or as long as they like. A sum score of correct responses are computed for each category.
Reading the mind in the eyes test (RTME). The RTME test is a measure that taps into
subtle differences in the attribution of appropriate mental states (i.e., sadness, joy) using 36 small
black and white visual cross-sections of the eye region (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, et al.,
2001). Participants select the appropriate mental state from 3 other incorrect “foils” and a sum
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score is computed. This makes calculating a Cronbach’s alpha score extremely difficult, however
test re-test methodology has established its reliability (Fernández-Abascal, Cabello, FernándezBerrocal, & Baron-Cohen, 2013; Vellante et al., 2013). This test is widely used in research on
ToM in general and ASC in specific, reliably separating individuals with clinical impairments in
social cognition from NT’s. Furthermore, this test has seen use in previous studies on religion
(Caldwell-Harris, Murphy, et al., 2011; Lindeman, Svedholm-Häkkinen, et al., 2015;
Norenzayan et al., 2012).
Cognitive Reflection Test. The CRT (Frederick, 2005) consists of three questions tapping
into an individual’s preference for analytic thinking compared to intuitive (e.g., A bat and a ball
cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost? While
the intuitive answer is typically 10 cents, the correct answer is 5 cents. This is a performance
based measure, developed in the field of behavioral economics, that is correlated with success
overcoming a number of cognitive biases (Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2011), specifically,
improbable or conflicting beliefs (Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2014;
Pennycook et al., 2016). Due to this, the CRT is commonly utilized as a measure of “analytic
thinking” and has never been explicitly operationalized as the SP component of ToM. This is
unfortunate, because the CRT’s psychometric properties (which taps into a domain general, Type
2 process, involving the selective inhibition of an intuitive choice for an alternative one) directly
overlap with the characterization of the SP (c.f., Frederick, 2005; Leslie, 2000; Leslie et al.,
2005; Toplak et al., 2011; Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2014). Additionally, the individual
differences found in CRT performance (Frederick, 2005) closely mirror the predicted pattern of
variation for ToM ability, male/female sex differences and their associated levels of religiosity
combined (Beit-Hallahmi, 2015; McCauley, 2011). This study will utilize the number of correct
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CRT responses, as well as the mean time spent attempting the questions for measurement. The
response time data was captured using using Qualtrics, measured from the first “click” to the last
“click” on the page.
Dawkins Theism “Scale.” In Richard Dawkins’ (2006) book, The God Delusion, he
posits that individuals can fall somewhere on a spectrum of belief in God from being certain of
His existence to certain of His nonexistence. He provides 7 categories of identification: Strong
Theist (e.g., I do not question the existence of God; I know he exists), De-Facto Theist, Weak
Theist, Pure Agnostic, Weak Atheist, De-Facto Atheist, and Strong Atheist (e.g., I am 100% sure
there is no God.). Measuring levels of (non)religiosity nominally, allowing participants to selfselect the term that best describes their position on God allows for a direct answer to the question
of ToM variability between atheists and theists. The de-facto and strong theist and atheist
categories will be collapsed to create 2 master categories: atheists and theists. Questions over
possible ToM differences in agnostics is beyond the scope of this proposal and they will be
excluded from the analyses along with the “weaker” belief categories.
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CHAPTER X.
RESULTS

Hypotheses 1–4: A series of two-way ANOVAs were conducted between religious
identification (atheist vs. theist) and gender (male vs. female) with each (sub)scale. Residual
analysis was performed to test for the assumptions of the two-way ANOVA. Outliers were
assessed by inspection of a q-q plot, normality was assessed using Shapiro-wilk’s normality test
for each cell design and homogeneity of variances was assessed by Leven’s test. All outliers
were kept in the data and in cases where residuals were non-normally distributed, skewness and
kurtosis were within acceptable range (-1.5, +1.5) to allow comparison (Tabachnick & Fidell,
2012). (See, table 4. below.) There was homogeneity of variance and equal variance was
assumed across all tests, except for the performance based measures CRT total, CRT time,
RMTE and for unambiguously accidental and unambiguously intentional subscales, which
function as “control” sentences and is expected (Rosset, 2008).
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Table 4 Sample Variances
Variable
RMTE
Rosset overall
Unambiguously
accidental
Prototypically
accidental
Unambiguously
intentional
Prototypically
intentional
BAPQ total
BAPQ-aloof
personality
BAPQ-pragmatic
language
BAPQ rigid
personality
CRT total
CRT time

N
2444
2889

M
26.0397
.4713

SD
3.71273
.09048

Skewness
-.851
-.002

2888

.0213

.06881

4.216

2887

.2654

.17487

.647

2887

.9927

.04340

-12.280

2888

.6068

.22570

-.381

2806

2.9525

.62051

.287

2707

3.2

.89207

.107

2712

2.7196

.64971

.520

2696

2.9343

.74627

.320

3433
2866

1.2196
4.2315

1.17476
.86358

.332
.270

Kurtosis
2.361
.856
20.795
.287
216.022
-.311
.145
-.486
.433
.219
-1.409
4.260

BAPQ overall: A two-way ANOVA was conducted to examine the effects of
(non)religious identification and gender. There was no significant difference between religious
identification F(1, 2503) = .373, p = .542, partial 𝜂2 = .000. Observed power was .094. There
was a significant difference between genders F(1, 2503) = 3.876, p = .049, partial 𝜂2 = .002.
Males had more overall BAPQ traits than females. Observed power was .503. There was no
significant interaction between religious identification and gender for BAPQ overall score F(1,
2503) = .013, p = .910, partial 𝜂2 = .000. Observed power was .051.
BAPQ aloof personality: A two-way ANOVA was conducted to examine the effects of
(non)religious identification and gender. There was a significant difference between religious
identification F(1, 2423) = 30.760, p < .001, partial 𝜂2 = .013. The atheist group had higher aloof
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traits than theist group. Observed power was 1.00. There was no significant difference between
gender F(1, 2423) = 2.782, p = .095, partial 𝜂2 = .001. Observed power was .385. There was no
significant interaction between religious identification and gender for BAPQ aloof F(1, .000) =
.000, p = .988, partial 𝜂2 = .000. Observed power was .050.
BAPQ pragmatic language problems: A two-way ANOVA was conducted to examine the
effects of (non)religious identification and gender. There was a significant difference between
religious identification F(1, 2423) = 6.858, p = .009, partial 𝜂2 = .003. The theist group had
higher pragmatic language problem scores than the atheist group. Observed power was .745.
There was a significant difference between gender F(1, 2423) = 8.910, p = .003, partial 𝜂2 =
.004. Observed power was .847. Males had higher pragmatic language problem scores than
females. There was no significant interaction between religious identification and gender F(1,
2423) = .218, p = .640, partial 𝜂2 = .000. Observed power was .075.
BAPQ Rigid personality: A two-way ANOVA was conducted to examine the effects of
(non)religious identification and gender. There was a significant difference between religious
identification F(1, 2409) = 6.628, p = .010, partial 𝜂2 = .003. The theist group had higher rigid
personality traits than the atheist group. Observed power was .730. There was no significant
interaction between gender F(1, 2409) = .007, p = .932, partial 𝜂2 = .000. Observed power was
.051. There was no significant interaction between religious identification and gender F(1, 2409)
= .758, p = .384, partial 𝜂2 = .000. Observed power was .140.
RMTE: A two-way ANOVA was conducted to examine the effects of (non)religious
identification and gender. There was no significant difference between religious identification
F(1, 2257) = .120, p = .730, partial 𝜂2 = .000. Observed power was .064. There was no
significant interaction between gender F(1, 2257) = 2.290, p = .130, partial 𝜂2 = .001. Observed
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power was .328. There was no significant interaction between religious identification and gender
F(1, 2257) = .075, p = .784, partial 𝜂2 = .000. Observed power was .059.
RIS, overall: A two-way ANOVA was conducted to examine the effects of (non)religious
identification and gender. There was no significant difference between religious identification
F(1, 2501) = 1.463, p = .227, partial 𝜂2 = .001. Observed power was .227. There was a
significant difference between gender F(1, 2501) = 5.549, p = .019, partial 𝜂2 = .002. Males
scored higher than females on the overall RIS. Observed power was .654. There was no
significant difference between religious identification and gender F(1, 2501) = .432, p = .511,
partial 𝜂2 = .000. Observed power was .101.
RIS, unambiguously accidental: A two-way ANOVA was conducted to examine the
effects of (non)religious identification and gender. There was a significant difference between
religious identification F(1, 2501) = 11.947, p = .001, partial 𝜂2 = .005. The theist group
responded with more “on purpose” answers than the atheist group. Observed power was .933.
There was no significant difference between gender F(1, 2501) = 1.984, p = .159, partial 𝜂2 =
.001. Observed power was .291. There was no significant difference between religious
identification and gender F(1, 2501) = 1.032, p = .310, partial 𝜂2 = .000. Observed power was
.174.
RIS, unambiguously intentional: A two-way ANOVA was conducted to examine the
effects of (non)religious identification and gender. There was a significant difference between
religious identification F(1, 2501) = 12.216, p < .001, partial 𝜂2 = .005. The atheist group
responded with more “on purpose” answers than the theist group. Observed power was .937.
There was a significant difference between gender F(1, 2501) = 13.308, p < .001, partial 𝜂2 =
.005. Females responded with more “on purpose” answers than males. Observed power was .954.
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There was a significant difference between religious identification and gender F(1, 2501) =
11.972, p = .001, partial 𝜂2 = .005. The male atheists and female theists and atheists responded
with more “on purpose” answers than the male theists. Observed power was .933.
RIS, prototypically accidental: A two-way ANOVA was conducted to examine the
effects of (non)religious identification and gender on the RIS unambiguously prototypically
accidental subscale. There was no significant difference between religious identification F(1,
2501) = .936, p = .333, partial 𝜂2 = .000. Observed power was .162. There was a significant
difference between gender F(1, 2501) = 5.345, p = .021, partial 𝜂2 = .002. Males responded with
more “on purpose” answers than females. Observed power was .637. There was no significant
difference between religious identification and gender F(1, 2501) = 1.067, p = .302, partial 𝜂2 =
.000. Observed power was .178.
RIS, prototypically intentional: A two-way ANOVA was conducted to examine the
effects of (non)religious identification and gender. There was no significant difference between
religious identification F(1, 2501) = 2.668, p = .103, partial 𝜂2 = .001. Observed power was .372.
There was a significant difference between gender F(1, 2501) = 4.302, p = .038, partial 𝜂2 =
.002. Males responded with more “on purpose” answers than females. Observed power was .545.
There was no significant difference between religious identification and gender F(1, 2501) =
.210, p = .647, partial 𝜂2 = .000. Observed power was .074.
CRT: A two-way ANOVA was conducted to examine the effects of (non)religious
identification and gender. There was a significant difference between religious identification F(1,
2505) = 22.504, p < .001, partial 𝜂2 = .009. The atheist group had more correct CRT responses
than the theist group. Observed power was .99. There was a significant difference between
gender F(1, 2505) = 28.471, p < .001, partial 𝜂2 = .011. Males had more correct CRT responses
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than females. Observed power was 1. There was no significant difference between religious
identification and gender F(1, 2505) = .071, p = .791, partial 𝜂2 = .011. Observed power was
.058.
CRT, time: CRT total response time data was transformed into a normal distribution
using natural logs. A two-way ANOVA was conducted to examine the effects of (non)religious
identification and gender. There was a significant difference between religious identification F(1,
2428) = 6.135, p =.013, partial 𝜂2 = .003. Regardless of whether or not their response was
correct, the atheist group spent more time attempting to solve the CRT than the theist group.
Observed power was .697. There was no significant difference between gender F(1, 2428) =
.804, p =.370, partial 𝜂2 = .000. Observed power was .146. There was no significant difference
between religious identification and gender F(1, 2428) = 1.607, p =.205, partial 𝜂2 = .001.
Observed power was .245.
Hypothesis 5: A Chi-square was conducted to explore whether or not ASC
(self)diagnoses would be more prevalent among atheists compared to theists. Of the 2516 cases
analyzed for the study, 74 individuals reported some diagnoses of ASC (theists N = 5; atheists N
= 69) and 2452 were non-ASC. A chi-square goodness of fit test was conducted to determine
whether ASC was overrepresented in atheists and underrepresented in theists. The test indicated
that the prevalence of ASC did not significantly differ across (non)religious identification (X2(1)
= 1.399, p = .237).
Hypothesis 6: A series of t-tests were conducted to test for differences between ASC
atheists and Non-ASC atheists on all measures. The BAPQ Aloof and Rigid subscales displayed
heterogeneity of variances and the “equal variances not assumed” (Welch-t test) column was
interpreted in the output. This test is robust, allowing for the comparison of groups with unequal
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variances (Weathington, Cunningham, & Pittenger, 2010; Welch, 1947). In order to control for
the increase in the probability of making a Type I error due to running multiple tests a
Bonferroni correction was calculated and the significance level was set to p = .004. All effect
sizes were calculated using Cohen’s d.

Table 5 ASC atheists vs. non-ASC atheists t-tests
ASC

Non-ASC

N

M

SD

RMTE

65

23.923

4.196

Rosset overall

69

.462

SD

CI

t

2113 26.176

3.534

-3.131, 1.375

-5.032

.089

2350

.473

.089

X

X

X

X

69

.013

.057

2350

.018

.063

X

X

X

X

69

.253

.159

2350

.268

.176

X

X

X

X

69

.999

.012

2350

.995

.032

X

X

X

X

69

.585

.242

2350

.611

.225

X

X

X

X

69

3.965

.566

2352

2.922

.593

67

4.296

.645

2277

3.196

.871

68

3.765

.686

2275

2.678

.617

.938,
1.237

14.260

<
1.7
.001

64

3.816

.957

2265

2.898

.722

.678,
1.160

7.621

<
1.1
.001

CRT total

69

1.652

1.122

2354

1.466

1.147

X

X

X

X

CRT time

64

4.117

.665

2282

4.252

.839

X

X

X

X

Unambiguously
accidental
Prototypically
accidental
Unambiguously
intentional
Prototypically
intentional
BAPQ total
BAPQ-aloof
personality
BAPQpragmatic
language
BAPQ rigid
personality

N

M
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.901,
1.185
.939,
1.261

14.415
13.605

p

d

<
.58
.001

<
1.8
.001
<
1.4
.001

CHAPTER XI.
DISCUSSION

Cognitive science explains religious (non)belief, in part, due to ToM ability. Indeed,
without the ability to make inferences about the unseen mental states of others, it is unlikely
supernatural beliefs would exist (J. L. Barrett, 2004, 2011, 2012; Bering, 2001, 2002). But upon
reflection, this kind of simple thinking resembles what Dennett (2009) terms a “deepity”—a
statement that is profoundly true yet utterly trivial. Other examples of deepities include “love is
just a word” and “the Theory of Evolution is only a theory”. Both of these statements describe
something true, perhaps even profound, but when put into a broader, more specific, meaningful,
context, they become trivial. Could the disciplinary mantra, “mentalizing underlies supernatural
belief” be a deepity? Scholarship on the cognitive and cultural foundations of religious belief
may comically wish to begin including lengthy, Victorian-esque, subtitles several lines long
(Norenzayan et al., 2016), in order to better describe claims that are accurate, yet trivial when
properly contextualized. This manuscript has argued for “religion” as a folk category, like
“belief,” which while a useful heuristic in many day-to-day pursuits and even scientific research,
ultimately belies these endeavors. Just like other abstract social representations, such as notions
of sister/brother hood (Berger & Luckmann, 1967), marriage, governments, and many other
institutions (Boyer & Petersen, 2012; Searle, 2013), the relationship between ToM and religion,
may be at such a fundamental level that it is certainly an important, indeed necessary, causal
variable in the generation, maintenance, and transmission of these representations, but it is not
sufficient.
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Atheism, ToM, and the BAP
The aim of this study was exploratory, it tested several hypotheses on the nature of the
relationship between ASC traits, gender, ToM, and supernatural (non)belief. Specifically, it
examined key components of the ToM system—intentionality, mental state attribution, selection
processor—and three components of the BAP—aloof personality, rigid personality, and
pragmatic language deficits. Despite being well informed by predictions in the empirical and
theoretical literature, this study failed to locate many differences where predicted. Out of 48
separate statistical tests, only 20 detected significant differences. Moreover, where significant
differences were identified, their practical and theoretical significance in support of robust or
even weak differences between atheists and theists is called into question. Interestingly, when
compared to atheists, the theists were significantly higher on two BAPQ subscales (a point that
will be returned to below). Overall, however, these results actually jibe well with recent studies
(Lindeman & Lipsanen, 2016) and cautionary pleas on the relationship between ToM and other
cognitive biases and their role in explaining supernatural (non)belief (Lindeman & SvedholmHäkkinen, 2016).
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Table 6 ANOVAS and t-test quick reference sheet
Atheist vs. theist
difference?

Gender
difference?

Interaction?

ASC atheist vs.
Non-ASC
atheist

RMTE

X

X

X

Yes

Rosset overall

X

Yes

X

X

Yes

Yes

X

X

X

Yes

X

X

Yes

Yes

Yes

X

X

Yes

X

X

X

Yes

X

Yes

Yes

X

X

Yes

Yes

Yes

X

Yes

Yes

X

X

Yes

CRT total

Yes

Yes

X

X

CRT time

Yes

X

X

X

Unambiguously
accidental
Prototypically
accidental
Unambiguously
intentional
Prototypically
intentional
BAPQ total
BAPQ-aloof
personality
BAPQ-pragmatic
language
BAPQ rigid
personality

The complete absence of differences on the RMTE is curious (except comparing ASC and nonASC atheists). However, it is possible that males and atheists utilized systemizing and analytic
skills in decoding the mental states, thereby masking possible differences in mentalizing (Valla
& Ceci, 2011). Another possibility, is that when CSR suggests ToM underlies supernatural
belief, they are referring to ToM at a wholly different level (Reddish et al., 2016), perceiving
minds and intentionality where there is none (Gervais, 2013b).
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Nonetheless, super natural belief (like nonbelief) is multiply determined (Banerjee &
Bloom, 2013; McCauley, 2011; Norenzayan & Gervais, 2013; Norenzayan et al., 2016), with
cognitive variables being only a (substantial?) component. As Norenzayan et al.(2016, p. 54)
argue, “therefore, we should not expect overwhelming effect sizes from cognitive variables alone
on religious beliefs.” While this is certainly an agreeable and humbling point, the effect sizes
found in the current study—when and where they occur—wouldn’t seem to meet even the
marginal differences predicted by this view. For example, in the current study, the effect size
showing atheists score higher than theists on only one BAP trait (aloof personality) was d = .013.
In other words, the variance present in the atheist and theist samples overlaps with one another
by roughly 99.6%. Despite the fairly small and often ambiguous empirical literature surrounding
ToM and supernatural (non)belief, which can be common for the early stages of inquiry into any
topic (Norenzayan et al., 2016), there are reasons to begin hedging bets that there is any
straightforward, meaningful, relationship between BAP traits or ToM that will be uncovered by
survey research—especially since (non)belief is multiply determined.
All effect sizes in the current study were small, sans the differences between ASC
atheists and non-ASC atheists. When compared to theists, atheists do not appear to have
mentalizing deficits. However, ASC atheists did score over a half standard deviation below nonASC atheists on mentalizing, and almost two standard deviations above non-ASC atheists on
BAP trait characteristics. Thus, the strongest difference identified in this study suggests that ASC
atheists differ markedly from non-ASC atheists.
While the ASC spectrum is often characterized by reduced religious belief, aspects of the
psychoses spectrum are related to increased religious belief (Gervais, 2013b; Wlodarski &
Pearce, 2016). A blurry distinction between schizophrenia and autism has haunted psychiatry
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since both were identified in the 20th century (Crespi, 2011b). From a social brain perspective,
autism and psychoses may place the atheist and the theist on fairly level playing field. If the
significant differences but marginal effect sizes are interpreted by others as having some strong
theoretical relationship to expected variation in BAP, then it is important to emphasize that
theists, and not just atheists, scored higher than one another on different components of the BAP.
In fact, Crespi (2011b) suggests that the BAPQ, captures some positive symptomologies of
psychoses.
Schizophrenia and autism are not “real,” “natural,” categories (Crespi, 2011b). Of the
many adaptations provided by the social brain in human evolution, mentalizing skills and the
capacity for analytic thought are key (Baron-Cohen & Belmonte, 2005). And while the literature
is replete with connections between autism and atheism or psychoses and religion, it remains
largely unconnected to informed discussions on the relationship between these psychiatric
categories, or rather, their non-natural kind and diffusion into normality and adaptive variation
under an evolutionary model.
This study suggests that atheists do not have deficits applying intentionality and
interestingly, they seem to be fairly judicious and discerning in their application of intentionality
where appropriate. For example, when compared to the atheist group, the theist group overattributed intentionality in ambiguous situations (e.g., “She cut him off driving.”) and underattributed intentionality in situations that most would consider fairly intentional (e.g., “She baked
a cake.”). This is in line with recent data suggesting that application of intentionality, teleology
rather, is better controlled by atheists (Järnefelt et al., 2015) and that nonreligious contexts may
encourage better tuning, better control (Rottman et al., 2016). After all, these kinds of
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mechanisms are learning mechanisms (H. C. Barrett, 2015), being open to and requiring
testimony and contextual influence.
The differences in atheist vs. theist applications of intentionality is also in line with data
suggesting that confusing ontological properties (i.e., applying intentionality to intention-less
objects or events) is a better predictor of supernatural belief than mentalizing ability (Lindeman,
Svedholm-Häkkinen, et al., 2015). It is important to consider that the “positive” symptoms of
schizophrenia concern the over extension of intentionality and mental states, whereas the RIS
taps into the ability to inhibit the application of intentionality as an adaptive human default,
explaining most any happening on earth (and surely Heaven). The “negative” symptoms of
schizophrenia concern deficits in social responsiveness and aspects of language manipulation
(Ochoa et al., 2012).
The female trend towards religiosity and male trend towards atheism is supported by this
data. However, given the research area is in its infancy, the various differences demonstrated by
theists and atheists on these measures are difficult enough to interpret that bringing gender into
the picture appears to complicate things even more—perhaps. To my knowledge, the RIS has
never been explored from a gender/sex differences perspective. In fact, it is a rather new measure
that has not seen much use to date, presumably due to this newness. It has however, been used in
a study of schizophrenia patients and a control group (Peyroux, Strickland, Tapiero, & Franck,
2014). While the researchers did not explore any possible sex differences, the sample of
schizophrenia patients demonstrated an intentionality bias above the control group in every
condition. Moreover, the researchers found the negative symptoms related most to attributions of
intentionality. In terms of the social brain continuum for these adaptive functional traits (Crespi,
2011b), again, the negative symptomology of schizophrenia appears to be expressed most
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strongly in males (Ochoa et al., 2012), these negative symptoms overlap with the symptomology
of ASC (Crespi & Badcock, 2008), and males are over represented in ASC (Baron-Cohen &
Belmonte, 2005). The BAPQ may capture some of the disorganized, negative, symptoms of
schizophrenia. The present study demonstrated that males had more overall BAPQ traits when
compared to females. The interpretation of ASC and schizophrenia as key variables of the social
brain, contributing to sex differences and differences in supernatural (non)belief, possibly
affected by ToM modular functioning, was not explicitly tested in the present study. However, in
light of other recent studies exploring psychoses and schizotypy traits, ASC, and supernatural
belief (Lindeman & Lipsanen, 2016; Wlodarski & Pearce, 2016), this remains a plausible, but
tangled path, to explaining differences in supernatural belief from a social brain perspective.
Whereas males performed worse at inhibiting intentionality compared to females, they
demonstrated an advantage at inhibiting intuitive, yet incorrect, responses on the CRT. This fits
with research indicating that on average, males appear to favor analytic cognitive styles (BaronCohen, 2009; Caldwell-Harris, 2012). Furthermore, males were overrepresented in the atheist
sample for the current study and the atheists outperformed theists, and spent more time reflecting
over the CRT problems regardless of their response. For the absence of differences between ASC
atheists and non-ASC atheists, it may be that they are more similar in analytic thinking styles to
one another, while differing markedly in mentalizing abilities and BAP traits.

Limitations and Future Directions
Sample size may have been one possible limitation, as the ratio of atheists to theists or
gender in the theist category, may have yielded some serendipitous results. However, there is no
single trend for how the variables measured here should play out empirically and future studies
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should examine gender differences whenever possible. It is possible that administering the RIS
and RMTE with speeded instructions would produce further differences and larger effect sizes.
Furthermore, while self-report, correlational methodology may be highly informative at some
levels of inquiry (e.g., Streib & Hood, 2016), it can be wholly remiss at other levels, as only a
small portion of mental processes are available for introspection (Jong, Halberstadt, & Bluemke,
2012; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Future studies should look for alternative ways to measure ToM,
drawing from the wide array of social cognitive tasks and experimental paradigms utilized within
the cognitive sciences as whole, and move beyond seeking correlations with the RMTE and selfreport measures of empathizing. Another possible limitation is that the language in the informed
consent, inviting participants to complete a survey on how “personality and cognitive styles
might influence religious belief and attributions of intentionality,” may have directly tipped
individuals off as to the studies purpose. Future studies must seek to include not only
measurements of religiosity as a dimensional construct (which has been the norm), but measure
supernatural (non)belief using implicit measures, alongside nominal categories of identification,
when exploring different variables in CSR. This should help to elucidate not only scientific
knowledge, but provide a more accurate presentation of this data to the general public.
Individuals always identify their “beliefs” nominally at the folk level and do not use mean scores
on dimensional religiosity scales to reply to the question “what are your (non)religious beliefs?”
The primary purpose of this study has been to test for social-cognitive differences
between atheist and believers. The role of ToM in explaining supernatural (non)belief is
emphasized to various degrees and in differing contexts depending on what literature is
consulted. This mirrors the point that CSR does not have a unified set of questions,
methodologies, and constructs. It does not, currently, comprise a stable research program with
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clear and well defined objectives and tools to reach them (Coleman, 2013; Jong, 2014). Although
it has been predicted that atheists may have deficits in ToM, the current data does not support
this hypothesis.
In closing, it is important to introduce a distinction that has been implicit up until this
point in the study. The difference between design space and phenotypical space is important to
understand when explaining variation in the social brain (H. C. Barrett, 2015). Design space is
the area where invariant, hill climbing, fitness increasing, evolutionary “designs,” can be acted
upon by natural selection. The ToM system exists in the design space (H. C. Barrett, 2015). The
design space is tethered to the phenotypic space, which concerns fitness relevant outcomes
exhibiting wide variation in a given environment. Variation in phenotypic space is always
expected and indeed necessary for evolution to work at all. Meaning in life is a high level,
adaptive, function of ToM (Bering, 2011), which represents the phenotypic space, within which,
humans develop in virtue of their species typical adaptation. For "religion," we might say that
meaning making is the central feature (Coleman, Silver, & Hood, 2016; Paloutzian & Park,
2013). Thus natural selection may not favor “religion” or “religious traits” per se, but instead
favor the construction of a meaningful worldview and existence—the will to meaning (Frankl,
1962)—that different individuals pursue in different ways. “Religious beliefs” can be “replaced”
(Farias, 2013). There is evidence in support of this view, demonstrated by the curvilinear
relationship between religious belief and wellbeing/health (Galen, 2015). As Galen (2015, p. 63)
describes the data, “it is beneficial to have a coherent worldview and to engage in regular
meaningful interactions with others who share this view in a supportive environment that allows
for prosocial engagement with the broader community.”
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Phenotypic space should not be confused with “design space” (H. C. Barrett, 2015). A
“religious phenotype” should not be confused with the possible design space of an evolutionary,
fitness relevant, adaptive complex, or mechanism(s) that places a premium on meaning, making
and finding meaning in life. Carving up the phenotypic space can be done in, potentially,
countless ways and this presents “a kind of frame problem, but not for [natural] selection—for
us” (H. C. Barrett, 2015, p. 174). Thus, the correlations between mentalizing and “religion” will
indubitably remain mixed and weak, especially if atheists and other nonreligious eschew
supernatural representations or beliefs in favor of other, equally counter intuitive, fantastical
ones, or meaningful ones (Coleman et al., 2016; Farias, 2013; Visuri, In Prep). There is a natural
world to be discovered and measured, but it is always done so without the “epistemological
grace” (Bloor, 2007) present in broad conceptualizations of “religion” and narrow
conceptualizations of “science.” There are more things in heaven and earth than have been
dreamt of in an evolutionary cognitive science of religion up until this point and perhaps it will
take an evolutionary cognitive science of atheism to explore them further.
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